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Networks, Information & Social Capital 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how information flows enable individuals to generate social capital from 
their social networks. By combining social network and performance data with the information 
content encoded in email communication, we examine the long held but empirically untested as-
sumption that diverse networks drive performance by providing access to novel information. We 
demonstrate empirically that diverse networks do provide diverse, novel information, and that ac-
cess to novel information predicts performance. But whether diverse networks deliver novel in-
formation depends on a tradeoff between network diversity and relationship channel bandwidth: 
as networks become more diverse, communication over each channel contracts. As network di-
versity and channel bandwidth both enable access to more novel information, diverse networks 
provide more novel information (a) when the topic space is large, (b) when topics are distributed 
non-uniformly across nodes and (c) when information in the network changes frequently. Diverse 
networks are not just pipes into diverse knowledge pools, but also inspire non-redundant commu-
nication even when the knowledge endowments of contacts are homogeneous. Consistent with 
theories of cognitive capacity, bounded rationality, and information overload, there are positive 
but diminishing performance returns to novel information. Network diversity also contributes to 
performance when controlling for the performance effects of novel information, suggesting addi-
tional non-information based benefits to structural diversity. These analyses unpack the mecha-
nisms that enable information advantages in networks and serve as a ‘proof-of-concept’ for using 
email content to analyze relationships among information, networks and social capital.   
 
 
Keywords: Social Networks, Social Capital, Information Content, Information Diversity, Network 
Size, Network Diversity, Performance, Productivity, Information Work. 
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Introduction 
The micro-social processes that govern how people create and appropriate value from social capi-
tal remain a fundamental yet understudied feature of modern sociology. Social capital has been defined as 
“the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 119). However, our theoretical and empirical understanding of the re-
sources networks provide, the mechanisms linking networks to resources, and the processes governing the 
creation and appropriation of value from resources distributed through networks remain vague (Adler & 
Kwon 2002).1 A prominent resource linking networks to value is information. Differential access to in-
formation, guided by differences in social structure, can not only create value, but may also help build 
other resources that contribute to social capital development. As information plays a central role in struc-
tural theories of social capital and brokerage, we focus on clarifying how networks create social capital 
and value through their influence on access to information.  
One of the most prominent mechanisms theorized to drive the relationship between social struc-
ture and value (typically defined as realized social or economic advantage) is the existence of ‘informa-
tion benefits’ to network structure. According to this argument, actors in diverse structural positions enjoy 
social and economic advantages based on their access to heterogeneous, novel information. Burt (1992) 
shows that individuals with structurally diverse networks (networks low in (a) cohesion, and (b) structural 
equivalence) are more successful in terms of wages, promotion, job placement, and creativity (Burt 
2004a). He argues that these performance differentials can be explained in part by actors’ access to di-
verse pools of knowledge, and their ability to efficiently gather non-redundant information – what he 
terms the ‘vision advantage’ (Burt 2004a).2 Aral, Brynjolfsson and Van Alstyne (2006) demonstrate that 
                                                          
1 As Adler & Kwon (2002: 4) note “[s]keptics have … characterized the social capital concept as “a wonderfully elastic term,” (Lappe & Du 
Bois 1997: 119), a notion that means “many things to many people” (Narayan & Pritchett 1997: 2), and [taking] on “a circus-tent quality” (De 
Souza Briggs 1997: 111).” 
2 Coleman’s (1988) argument, that focused information from cohesive networks provides more precise signals of actors’ environments, also 
assumes that cohesive networks provide focused (while diverse networks provide diverse) information.  
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structural diversity is associated with higher levels of performance for task-based information workers. 
These studies, and numerous others, infer that network diversity is associated with performance in part 
because diverse contacts provide access to novel information (e.g. Sparrowe et al. 2001, Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001, Cummings & Cross 2003). Novel information is thought to be valuable due to its local 
scarcity. Actors with scarce, novel information in a given network neighborhood are better positioned to 
broker opportunities, make better decisions, or apply information to problems that are intractable given 
local knowledge. 
But, while there is abundant evidence linking social structure to performance (e.g. Burt 1992, 
2004a, 2007, Reagans and Zuckerman 2001, Cummings 2004, Aral, Brynjolfsson & Van Alstyne 2006, 
2007), direct evidence on information flowing through networked relationships is rarely used to validate 
information-based theories of social capital. As a consequence, our theories of the role of information in 
social capital formation and our understanding of how and why social structure explains economic out-
comes remain underdeveloped. Comprehensive theories of the structure-performance relationship require 
a more thorough examination of the intermediate information mechanisms through which social structure 
affects economic advantage. As Burt (2005: 60) has recently noted: “There is abundant and accumulating 
empirical evidence of returns to brokerage. Evidence on the mechanism is not abundant. Initial research 
established the social capital potential of brokerage by focusing on returns to brokerage … The next phase 
of work is to understand the information-arbitrage mechanisms by which people harvest the value buried 
in structural holes … More generally, the sociology of information will be central in the work …”  
We embark on this next phase of inquiry by directly examining the central premise of the infor-
mation advantage argument: that diverse social structure drives performance by providing access to novel 
information. Using detailed empirical evidence on information content flowing through email networks in 
a medium sized executive recruiting firm, we lay the groundwork for a new, replicable mode of inquiry 
into how information flows generate social capital. Our research setting is well suited to this investiga-
tion: Since recruiters were frequently geographically dispersed and since instant messaging was rarely 
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used, recruiters relied on email as a primary means of communication.3 To build theory relating network 
structure to information structure we investigate how topological properties of individuals’ network posi-
tions (network size and network diversity) impact the diversity and novelty of the information they re-
ceive and distribute, and whether this in turn explains productivity and performance.4  
The data and empirical methods also deserve special note. We collected and analyzed the topical 
content of email messages to determine the relative heterogeneity and novelty of the information passed 
between employees at the firm. Previous research by Wu et. al. (2004) and Kossinets & Watts (2006) has 
validated the usefulness of email data in characterizing and analyzing social networks in firms and aca-
demic institutions. We complement and extend this research by combining analysis of the social structure 
of email communication with evaluation of the information content of messages. We argue that combin-
ing analysis of message content and communication topology can open new avenues for answering ques-
tions at the heart of the sociology of information.  
Our analyses uncover four primary results. First, we demonstrate that structural diversity predicts 
access to diverse novel information, and that diverse novel information in turn enables higher levels of 
productivity and performance. These findings provide empirical support for what has been a critical infer-
ence at the heart of social capital and brokerage theory. Our results also disentangle the effects of exper-
tise endowments (the stocks of information, expertise and knowledge individuals build over time) from 
the effects of information flows (information shared between individuals in conversation and correspon-
dence). While networks provide channels into the pools of information with which contacts are endowed, 
these links do not guarantee that information will flow. Individuals with diverse networks have contacts 
with more heterogeneous knowledge on average. But, because social structures contextualize and inform 
choices about which information is shared and with whom we share it, having a diverse communication 
network is a better predictor of access to diverse novel information than the heterogeneity of the knowl-
                                                          
3 We thank Ron Burt for emphasizing this point. 
4 The term “information structure” is used in the economics literature to denote the mapping of states of nature to signals i.e. news, received by a 
decision maker (see Arrow 1985). We use the term to mean the distribution of information across a network. 
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edge endowments of one’s contacts. We explore why this is the case and the implications for information 
based theories of social capital. 
Second, we find evidence of a tradeoff between network diversity and relationship channel band-
width, the communication volume observed between individuals.5 Although diverse networks should de-
liver information that is heterogeneous across channels (or alters), they are also made up of dispropor-
tionately weaker ties, implying lower bandwidth channels of communication (e.g. more infrequent com-
munication across fewer topical dimensions). As networks become more diverse, channel bandwidth de-
creases. This tradeoff has implications for access to information because all else equal higher bandwidth 
channels deliver more diverse information due to the heterogeneity of the information flowing within each 
channel. As a result, whether diverse-low bandwidth networks deliver more diverse information than co-
hesive-high bandwidth networks ultimately depends on (a) the dimensionality of the information in the 
network (whether the total number of topics communicated across the entire network is large or small), 
(b) the distribution of information across the network (whether topics are uniformly or unevenly distrib-
uted across nodes) and (c) the rate at which the information in the network refreshes or changes. 
Third, diminishing returns set in at two levels: Network size is a concave predictor of information 
diversity, and perhaps more importantly, there are diminishing marginal benefits to novel information. 
Part of the explanation for the decreasing contribution of network size to information diversity is that 
network diversity is increasing in network size, but with diminishing returns. As actors establish relation-
ships with a finite set of possible contacts in an organization, the probability that a new relationship will 
be non-redundant and provide access to novel information decreases as possible connections in the net-
work are exhausted. In addition, the marginal value of novel information is itself bounded. Consistent 
with evidence on the limits to human cognitive capacity, we find declining marginal benefits to more 
                                                          
5 We use the phrase relationship “channel bandwidth” carefully, and in preference to the more inclusive “strong  tie” to draw attention to the 
volume of literal communication shared among people.  In general, stronger ties imply greater bandwidth but the added precision allows us to 
also handle unusual cases. For example, adult children may have strong ties to parents based on emotional affinity, trust, or care-giving, yet be 
observed to communicate more frequently with co-workers who are less emotionally significant in their lives. We draw out the importance of 
focusing on information diversity, actually observed over a communications channel, in developing the theories that follow. 
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novel information. After a point, too much information is associated with decreasing and negative per-
formance returns. This result implies limits to the value of more novel information and larger, more di-
verse networks.  
Finally, network diversity contributes to performance even when controlling for the performance 
effects of novel information, suggesting additional benefits to diverse networks beyond those conferred 
through information based mechanisms. Somewhat surprisingly, traditional demographic and human 
capital variables (e.g. age, gender, industry experience, education) have little effect on access to diverse 
information, highlighting the importance of network structure for information advantage.  
These results represent some of the first evidence on the relationship between network structure 
and information content. The findings advance our understanding of the economic value of information 
and the intermediate mechanisms driving the relationship between social structure and productivity. Our 
methods for analyzing network structure and information content in email data are replicable, opening a 
new line of inquiry into the relationships among networks, information and social capital. 
 
Theory  
Network Structure & Information Advantage: A Critical Inference 
The assumption that network structure influences the distribution of information and knowledge 
in social groups (and thus characteristics of the information to which individuals have access) underpins a 
significant amount of theory linking social structure to economic outcomes (e.g. Simmel 1922 (1955), 
Moreno 1940, Granovetter 1973, Baker 1990, Burt 1992, Padgett & Ansell 1993, Podolny 2001, Reagans 
& Zuckerman 2001). Granovetter (1973) argues that topological properties of friendship networks, con-
strained by basic norms of social interaction, empower weak ties to deliver information about socially 
distant opportunities more effectively than strong ties. He posits that contacts maintained through weak 
ties typically “move in circles different from our own and thus have access to information different from 
that which we receive… [and are therefore]… the channels through which ideas, influence, or information 
socially distant from ego may reach him” (Granovetter 1973: 1371). Burt (1992) argues that networks rich 
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in structural diversity confer “information benefits” by providing access to diverse perspectives, ideas and 
information. As information in local network neighborhoods tends to be redundant, structurally diverse 
contacts provide channels through which novel information flows to individuals from distinct pools of 
social activity. Redundant information is less valuable because many actors are aware of it at the same 
time, reducing opportunities associated with its use. Structural redundancy is also inefficient because ac-
tors incur costs to maintain redundant contacts while receiving no new information from them (Burt 
1992). 
In contrast, exposure to diverse ideas, perspectives, and solutions is thought to enable information 
arbitrage, the creation of new innovations, and access to economic opportunities. Hargadon and Sutton 
(1997) describe how engineers use their structural positions between diverse engineering and scientific 
disciplines to broker the flow of information and knowledge from unconnected industrial sectors, creating 
novel design solutions. As Burt (2004b) puts it, “creativity is an import-export game,… not a creation 
game.” The value of information in a network stems from its uneven distribution across actors and resides 
in pockets of distinct and diverse pools of information and expertise in local network neighborhoods. Ac-
tors with access to these diverse pools “benefit from disparities in the level and value of particular knowl-
edge held by different groups…” (Hargadon & Sutton 1997: 717), and one of the key mechanisms 
through which network structures are theorized to improve performance is through access to novel, non-
redundant information (Burt 1992). 
While the argument that network structures influence performance through their effect on the dis-
tribution of information is intuitive and appealing, the vast majority of empirical work on networks and 
information advantage remains ‘content agnostic’ (Hansen 1999: 83), and infers the relationship between 
network structure and information structure from evidence of a link between networks and performance 
(e.g. Sparrowe et al. 2001, Cummings & Cross 2003). Reagans & Zuckerman (2001) infer that productiv-
ity gains from the external networks of corporate R&D teams are due in part to “information benefits,” “a 
broader array of ideas and opportunities,” and access to “different skills, information and experience.” 
Burt (1992, 2004a) also makes this assumption, inferring that the observed co-variation of wages, promo-
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tion, job placement, and creativity with network diversity is due in part to access to diverse and novel in-
formation. Some equate network content with the social function of relationships. For example, Burt 
(2000: 45) refers to “network content” as “the substance of relationships, qualities defined by distinctions 
such as friendship versus business versus authority.” In one of the first studies to explore this type of net-
work content, Podolny & Baron (1997) showed that while cohesive ties are beneficial in ‘buy-in’ net-
works and for those contacts that have control over the fate of employees, structural holes are important 
for collecting advice and information. Others define network content as the “attributes of the nodes” with 
respect to their self reported knowledge (Rodan & Galunic 2004).  
We take a different view of network content, focused on the subject matter of communication 
flowing through the network rather than on the social function of relationships or actors’ knowledge 
stocks. By focusing on the topical content of communication (as well as actors’ knowledge) we distin-
guish information flows from knowledge endowments. As roles do not necessarily imply communication 
content and as not all knowledge possessed by an individual is necessarily shared or successfully trans-
ferred (Reagans & McEvily 2003), examining topical information flows between actors is critical to theo-
ries explaining how information and knowledge move and are distributed in networks, and how informa-
tion in turn enables social capital development. 
The limited research that empirically examines information transfer in networks has either fo-
cused on identifying tie and network characteristics that facilitate effective knowledge transfers; or on 
types of information (e.g. complex or simple; tacit or explicit) most effectively transferred through differ-
ent types of ties. As a result, the fundamental assumption that structurally diverse network contacts pro-
vide access to diverse and novel information remains unexplored. For example, several studies examine 
how characteristics of dyadic relationships, like the strength of ties, impact the effectiveness of knowl-
edge transfer, and how knowledge transfer processes in turn affect performance (Granovetter 1973, Uzzi 
1996, 1997, Hansen 1999). These studies infer the impact of network structure on the effectiveness of 
knowledge sharing from the strength of individual dyadic relationships. Reagans & McEvily (2003) ex-
tend this work by simultaneously examining the effects of tie strength and network structure on the ease 
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of transferring knowledge between individuals. These studies either examine the strength of dyadic ties or 
the impact of network structure on discrete dyadic information transfer events, rather than on the informa-
tion actors receive from all their network contacts in concert. Others examine characteristics of the infor-
mation transferred across different types of ties. For example, Hansen (1999, 2002) and Uzzi (1996, 
1997) explore the degree to which knowledge being transferred is tacit or codifiable, simple or complex, 
and related or unrelated to a focal actor’s knowledge, and Fleming et al. (2007) examine brokerage and 
cohesion in patent collaboration and knowledge in patent content. 
To complement this research, we ask a related, yet fundamentally different question: Do networks 
affect the acquisition of diverse and novel information and to what extent does this intermediate mecha-
nism predict performance? In pursuing this question, we undertake three fundamental departures from the 
current literature. First, by exploring the relative information content differences among different network 
contacts, we explore actors’ information diversity evaluated in relation to the body of information avail-
able in the entire network. Second, we focus on subject matter. Rather than characterizing the simplicity 
or complexity of information, or the degree to which knowledge is codifiable or tacit, we explore the 
topical content being discussed. Both simple and complex information can have either focused or diverse 
topical content. Complexity and codifiability do not describe whether information is topically similar or 
dissimilar, or novel relative to a larger body of knowledge. Third, we focus on the flow of information 
between actors, as well as the information that resides at each node. Disentangling information flows 
from information stocks is important because “knowledge transfer is a discretionary activity” (Regans & 
McEvily 2003: 243). A variety of social and organizational factors could distinguish the information with 
which actors are endowed from the information they choose to pass on and succeed in transferring (Aral 
et. al. 2007, Wu et. al. 2004). As the theoretical mechanism linking structure to performance through in-
formation rests on the relative novelty of the information actors send and receive, these three departures 
from previous research are critical to effectively exploring the dimensions of information theorized to 
drive value in networks. 
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 In the absence of empirical evidence on the information processes that enable social networks to 
generate social capital, we develop theory about the relationships between network structure and access to 
heterogeneous, novel information, and between access to heterogeneous, novel information and perform-
ance.  
----- FIGURE 1 ----- 
Our arguments problematize and unpack these relationships and our empirical analyses provide evidence 
on how networks generate social capital through their effects on information flow. 
 
Network Structure & Access to Heterogeneous, Novel Information 
Two network characteristics in particular are theorized to drive access to diverse, novel informa-
tion: network size and network diversity. These characteristics are discussed extensively in the literature 
and are fundamental because they represent the two dimensions of structure most directly related to in-
formation acquisition. As Burt (1992: 16) argues “everything else constant, a large, diverse network is the 
best guarantee of having a contact present where useful information is aired…” Network size is the most 
familiar structural feature of networks theorized to deliver more novel information (Burt 1992). A larger 
network puts individuals in the flow of ideas and connects them with more potentially useful sources of 
information. However, growing an expansive network with redundant contacts is unlikely to increase ac-
cess to novel information. Structurally diverse networks provide channels into different pools of informa-
tion and knowledge and put individuals in contact with diverse social groups. Diverse networks – net-
works low in constraint and structural equivalence – are therefore likely to deliver more diverse and novel 
information. These are the central inferences on which structural theories of social capital and brokerage 
rest. We therefore expect that network size and network diversity are positively associated with receiving 
more diverse information and more total non-redundant information. 
Network Diversity & Knowledge Heterogeneity. The leading theoretical explanation for why di-
verse networks should deliver diverse information is couched in terms of access to diverse knowledge 
stocks – that diverse networks provide links into heterogeneous pools of information (e.g. Simmel 1922 
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(1955), Granovetter 1973, Caro 1982, Burt 1992, Reagans & Zuckerman 2001). Information shared 
within social groups is theorized to be more homogeneous than information shared across groups (Burt 
2004a). This should create opportunities for individuals with diverse networks to access heterogeneous 
pools of information that are novel relative to the information in their own local network neighborhoods 
(Rodan & Galunic 2004). A necessary condition of this theory is that diverse networks connect individu-
als to alters with heterogeneous knowledge and experience. Whether structural diversity delivers diverse 
information is, according to this argument, a function of the extent to which diverse structure accesses 
heterogeneous subsets of the information space in a network. If the population of alters has relatively ho-
mogeneous information then structural diversity should matter relatively little. We therefore expect that 
network diversity is positively associated with the knowledge heterogeneity of actors’ contacts. 
Knowledge similarity in organizational settings can arise from educational or demographic simi-
larities, overlapping expertise (Reagans & McEvily 2003) or project co-work (Rodan & Galunic 2004, 
Aral et. al 2007). Since executive recruiting does not require specialized educational attainment, employ-
ees in our firm develop expertise and accumulate stocks of knowledge in domains pertaining to the work 
they complete by working on projects of different types and developing expertise in specialized executive 
searches. Employees with similar backgrounds who work on similar projects or in similar functional areas 
develop overlapping sets of expertise and rely on similar bodies of knowledge to conduct their work. 
Common knowledge, derived from common prior experience, helps ease knowledge transfer (Reagans & 
McEvily 2003) and structures the topics of conversation employees are likely to share (Burt 1987, 1992, 
Cohen & Levinthal 1990, Rogers 1995, Smith-Loving, & Cook 2001). If knowledge and expertise within 
work groups is more homogeneous than across them, then access to different groups, with varied exper-
tise should facilitate receipt of more diverse and (from the focal actor’s point of view) novel information. 
For this reason we expect that the knowledge heterogeneity of an actor’s contacts is positively associated 
with receiving more diverse information and more total non-redundant information. 
Distinguishing Information Flows From Knowledge Stocks. While links to alters with diverse 
knowledge stocks should increase the likelihood of receiving more diverse and novel information, infor-
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mation may not necessarily flow in direct proportion to information endowments. There are two prevail-
ing views of network content that deserve special attention in the case of information flows. These ap-
proaches view networks either as “pipes” or “prisms” (Podolny 2001). In his study of venture capital 
markets, Podolny (2001: 33) argues that economic sociologists and organizational scholars have tradi-
tionally regarded networks as “plumbing” or “the channels or conduits through which “market stuff” (in-
cluding information) flows.”6 But, as Podolny (2001: 34) (citing Baum & Oliver’s (1992) study of day 
care centers and Podonly’s (1993) study of investment banks) argues, ties are not merely pipes in the 
plumbing, but also “an informational cue on which others rely to make inferences…,” (in his case about 
the quality of potential transaction partners). The same logic applies to information flows in networks – 
ties may not simply be conduits for information, but may also inform decisions about what information is 
shared and with whom. 
We have little empirical evidence on how information moves through social groups (Wu et. al. 
2004), or the relationships between social structure and information flow (for a review of the literature on 
information diffusion in networks see Aral et. al. 2007). Though most current views define network con-
tent as the “attributes of nodes” to which ties give access (e.g. Rodan & Galunic 2004), information ex-
change is a social process and knowledge transfer is a discretionary activity (Reagans & McEvily 2003, 
Wu et. al. 2004). A connection to an individual with a certain information endowment affords the possi-
bility of receiving that information, but by no means guarantees it. As Wu et. al. (2004: 328) point out: 
“There are … differences between information flows and the spread of viruses. While viruses tend to be 
indiscriminate, infecting any susceptible individual, information is selective and passed by its host only to 
individuals the host thinks would be interested in it.” In fact, the distinction can be expressed more starkly 
– information is sometimes withheld even when it is known to be of interest to others, reflecting complex 
selection and discretion in social choices concerning information sharing. 
                                                          
6 Parenthesis added by the authors. Podolny (2001) mentions in the next sentence that “market stuff” encompasses information as well as goods, 
services and transactions. 
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Most current models of information flow in networks implicitly assume that information will 
flow in proportion to the distribution of information in the network. An actor’s likelihood of receiving 
information is generally assumed to be some function of the strength of ties to others endowed with that 
information or the number of ties in the actor’s network that have the information in question (e.g. 
Granovetter 1978, Schelling 1978, Kleinberg, Kempe & Tardros 2003).7 However, networks may not 
simply be pipes into different pools of information. Network structure may also correlate with the choices 
individuals make about which information they share. For example, we may hesitate to share sensitive 
information with someone we know is part of our own tightly clustered social circle for fear of it ‘getting 
back to us,’ or we may chose to share the subset of our information stock that pertains to our role vis-a-vis 
our communication partners (with roles reflected in structural similarities). An individual embedded in a 
cohesive social structure may be more likely to receive redundant information not only because their 
communication partners possess homogeneous knowledge and experience, but also because social cohe-
sion and structural equivalence reflect social circumstances that inspire communication partners to pass 
on redundant information even when their knowledge stocks are heterogeneous. Prior theory and empiri-
cal evidence support this conjecture. Social cohesion and interdependence has been shown to promote 
solidarity (Durkeim 1933 (1893)), support (Durkheim 1951 (1897)) and behavioral homogeneity (Lazars-
feld et. al. 1944, Coleman et. al. 1966) primarily due to communication. Social cohesion may also reflect 
similarities in activity, purpose, task and the circumstances of a particular time and place. Localized 
knowledge and information pertaining to local tasks or circumstances are likely to be shared by those who 
communicate regardless of their prior experience. These types of information and knowledge are pertinent 
to production activities and are typically localized in social groups close to common activities (Hayek 
                                                          
7 Two core models have emerged to explain the diffusion of influence and contagion. Threshold models posit that individuals adopt innovations 
(or receive information) after surpassing their own private “threshold” (e.g. Granovetter 1978, Schelling 1978). Cascade models posit that each 
time an adjacent individual adopts, the focal actor adopts with some probability that is a function of their relationship (e.g. Kempe, Kleinberg, 
Tardos 2003). While both models assume an information transmission between adopters and non-adopters, they rarely specify the nature of the 
information or the conditions under which exchanges take place. Rather, the diffusion process is typically tested under various assumptions about 
the distribution of thresholds or dyadic adoption probabilities in the population. In fact, as Kempe, Kleinberg, Tardos (2003: 2) explain “the fact 
that [thresholds] are randomly selected is intended to model our lack of knowledge of their values.” 
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1945). In organizational settings these activities involve working on the same projects or executing mana-
gerial responsibilities together. In addition, structural equivalence reflects role similarity (Friedkin 1984, 
Burt 1987, Borgatti & Everett 1993). Structurally equivalent alters are likely to perform similar social and 
organizational roles amongst their peers (Burt 1987). If structural equivalence is a proxy for role equiva-
lence, then two structurally equivalent individuals may share the same subset of their information stock 
with a third party due to the similarity of their roles in their relationships to that third party even if their 
overall knowledge stocks are highly heterogeneous. The potential relationship between social structure 
and choices concerning information sharing suggests that in order to empirically substantiate theories of 
information-based social capital formation in networks we need evidence not only of actors’ information 
endowments, but also of the information content actors actively share with one another. 
Thus, a natural question arises: do diverse network ties deliver diverse information primarily by 
acting as pipes into heterogeneous pools of knowledge and expertise, or do individuals embedded in co-
hesive ties share similar information due to social similarities of time, place, task and role regardless of 
the heterogeneity of their knowledge and expertise? Both of these mechanisms could simultaneously be at 
play and there is also likely to be correspondence between knowledge endowment homogeneity and so-
cial cohesion as we have hypothesized. To determine the relative strength of these mechanisms, we esti-
mate whether communication network diversity moderates the relationship between contact knowledge 
heterogeneity and access to diverse novel information or visa versa (Baron & Kenny 1986). If network 
diversity moderates the relationship between knowledge heterogeneity and access to diverse information, 
we have preliminary evidence that cohesive social structure influences the similarity of information flows 
above and beyond the influence of the similarity of the prior experience and knowledge of actors in cohe-
sive networks, suggesting that networks are not merely ‘pipes’ into diverse pools of information, but also 
‘prisms’ on which actors make inferences about which information to actively share. 
Network Diversity & Channel Bandwidth. In examining the relationship between network diver-
sity and information diversity, it is important to distinguish the diversity of information flows across ties 
from the diversity of the information flowing within each tie. Theoretical arguments concerning network 
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diversity and novel information have thus far focused almost exclusively on the relative diversity of the 
information received across alters in a network, rather than the diversity of information flowing within 
each tie (or channel) over time. When within-channel diversity is considered, the inference that network 
diversity drives performance by providing diverse, novel information is less straightforward in light of 
empirical evidence that diverse networks are made up of disproportionately weaker ties. While cohesive 
or constrained ties typically deliver information that is redundant across channels (which we refer to as 
‘information bias’), they are also typically stronger (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992), implying greater 
bandwidth. Weak ties are by their nature lower bandwidth conduits for information (Granovetter 1973, 
Burt 1992). Information should flow less frequently (Granovetter 1973), with lower complexity (Hansen 
1999) and detail (Uzzi 1999), and along fewer topical dimensions (see Granovetter 1973: p 1361) through 
weak ties. Social cohesion motivates individuals to devote time and effort to communicating with and 
assisting others due to the cooperative nature of ties surrounded by other third party ties (Granovetter 
1985, Coleman 1988). The development of cooperative norms (Granovetter 1992) and the subsequent 
reduction in competition reflected in cohesive ties are likely to increase knowledge transfer between indi-
viduals embedded in cohesive networks (Szulanski 1996, Argote 1999, Reagans & McEvily 2003). Given 
evidence on the prevalence of weak ties in diverse networks and the likelihood of increased knowledge 
flow in cohesive networks, the bandwidth of communication channels should be lower in diverse net-
works. Thus, we expect that network diversity is associated with lower channel bandwidth. 
When channel bandwidth is incorporated into the argument, whether diverse networks deliver di-
verse information depends not only on the diversity of the network around ego, but also on the bandwidth 
of the channels and the interplay between network diversity and channel bandwidth. Centola & Macy 
(2007) make a related yet distinct argument about contagions based on the number of ties rather than the 
bandwidth of channels. A simple model demonstrates that although a diverse network of weak ties (“di-
verse-weak”) can provide access to more novel information than a constrained network of strong ties 
(“constrained-strong”), the converse is also possible. To illustrate, let E represent the event that an ego 
encounters new information through a new link.  If n is a subset of all possible topics T (n<T ), then an 
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actor receives “biased” content if she is more likely to receive news on one set of topics than another 
(p1>p2), where p1 and p2 are the probabilities of receiving information from topic subsets n1 and n2. More 
precisely, a person with biased content has an asymmetric distribution over the likelihood of seeing dif-
ferent topics. Note that basic laws of probability require n p1 + (T-n) p2=1. Since the likelihood of encoun-
tering new information depends on what ego has learned from existing links, let L represent current con-
tacts.8 Then P[Ec], the probability of encountering novel information from a new constrained link, can be 
described as:9 
 ( ) ( )LLc pnTppnpEP 2211 1)(1][ −−+−=                  [1] 
Unbiased content implies p1= p2, so that Equation 1 reduces to P[ED] = pT(1-p)L, where Ec and ED 
represent the events of forging a constrained and a diverse link and getting new information.10  To model 
the more frequent communication of the higher bandwidth tie, let B represent additional chances to cover 
new material over the constrained link during any given interval.  Simplifying with n2=T-n1 gives total 
accumulated probability of: 
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To see that a constrained-strong tie could offer more novel information, let p1 = p2 + ε implying negligible 
bias so that P[Ec] ≈ P[ED].  Then choose any B large enough such that the following inequality is strict: 
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This demonstrates the original claim that a constrained-strong tie can supply a greater volume of novel 
information than a diverse-weak tie provides. When the advantage of bandwidth swamps the disadvantage 
                                                          
8 More precisely, l represents an information exchange with an existing link. In probabilistic terms it is a sample on link l such that ego receives 
information on a given topic n
i
 with probability p
i
 from each sample, making the likelihood of receiving new information a function of the num-
ber of samples (or analogously, the thickness of the communication channel). 
9 Since our purpose is illustrative rather than proof theoretic, we refrain from presenting non-essential primitives and assumptions here and pre-
sent the derivation of Equation 1 in Appendix A. 
10 The likelihood of encountering novel information (for both constrained and unconstrained ties) decreases strictly and asymptotically toward 0 
with each additional tie L. This exactly mirrors the pattern we observe empirically as shown later in Figure 5. 
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of bias, an ego always prefers the constrained-strong tie to the diverse-weak tie to increase the chances of 
encountering novel information. 
To see when an diverse-weak tie could be preferred, let a “group think” network spread its band-
width only over the subset of n topics with probability p1=B/T (such bias necessarily constrains p2 ≈ ε).  
For ease of simplification, let n = T/B. Then algebra reduces the relative probabilities to: 
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This alternative case demonstrates the counterclaim, that a diverse-weak tie can supply a greater volume 
of novel information than a constrained-strong tie provides. Although ][...][][
c
BL
c
L
C
L EPEPEP ++=  and 
increasing B adds more terms to ][ CLEP and none to ][
D
LEP , it also causes each term to approach 0 faster.  
No matter how large the bandwidth on constrained ties, there always exists a fixed number of links L such 
that link L+1 should be an unconstrained tie. When the disadvantage of bias swamps the advantage of 
bandwidth, an ego always prefers the diverse-weak tie to the constrained-strong tie to increase chances of 
encountering novel information. While an enormous range of intermediate cases span these two extremes, 
conditions exist when a person could always prefer one or the other type of link depending on bias, 
bandwidth, and the number of links already present. All else equal, greater channel bandwidth should 
provide access to more diverse information. Stronger ties imply tighter relationships and thicker channels 
of communication. In relationships characterized by strong ties and high channel bandwidth, contacts are 
likely to be more willing to share information and to be similar across a greater number of dimensions, 
inspiring information exchanges across a larger number and a wider variety of topics. Our model implies 
that as the bandwidth of a channel increases, the topical diversity of the information flowing through it 
should also increase, providing recipients more chances to encounter novel information. We therefore 
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expect, all else equal, that channel bandwidth is positively associated with receiving more diverse and 
novel information. 11 
If greater structural diversity limits channel bandwidth and if channel bandwidth provides access 
to more novel information, then estimates of the impact of network diversity on access to novel informa-
tion that exclude channel bandwidth will be downward biased. Controlling for variance explained by 
channel bandwidth should therefore increase the strength of the positive association between network di-
versity and access to diverse and novel information. In addition to bandwidth and bias, it follows from our 
model that access to more diverse information depends on the interaction of at least three additional fac-
tors beyond structural diversity: (a) the dimensionality of the information in the network (whether the to-
tal number of topics communicated across the entire network is large or small), (b) the distribution of top-
ics over nodes (whether topics are uniformly or non-uniformly distributed across the network and (c) the 
rate at which the information in the network refreshes or changes. 12 Although in our empirical setting we 
                                                          
11 We distinguish channel bandwidth from the strength of ties although they are likely correlated. The strength of a tie may be a noisy reflection 
of the bandwidth of the channel. More detailed empirical work on the relationship between the strength of ties and the bandwidth of channels may 
provide evidence on how the social function of relationships (Podolny & Barron 1997, Burt 2000) is associated with the nature of the conduits of 
information flow they enable. We encourage this work although we do not focus on it here. 
12 The first important factor determining the relative importance of bandwidth and bias in this theoretical framework is the dimensionality of the 
information space being considered. In a network in which there are relatively few topics and total information diversity is low, we expect bias to 
be more important than bandwidth. In contrast, when the dimensionality of the information space is high, with a large number of topics and a 
high degree of information diversity across the entire network, we expect bandwidth to play a more significant role in determining access to novel 
information. We show the robustness of our basic insight as information diversity increases or, in this case, as T increases without bound.  For 
both the biased strong tie and the unbiased weak tie we have: 
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This should make intuitive sense because new links are more likely to provide novel information when the number of possible topics vastly ex-
ceeds that covered by prior links.  Yet, the likelihood of learning about any specific topic falls as the number of total topics grows.  The ratio, 
however, is extremely informative.  If the biased strong tie provides B times more bandwidth (see Appendix A), then the ratio simplifies to 
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.  Thus in a world of highly diverse information, i.e. T very large, an ego 
should prefer strong ties, even though they are biased, because they provide much more total new information. In our setting, we expect the dis-
advantage of bias to swamp the advantage of bandwidth. Interviews indicate that the dimensionality of information content in executive recruiting 
is limited (in the parlance of our model T, the space of topics, is small) meaning thicker channels are not as necessary to communicate informa-
tion on more topics. Therefore, as individuals communicate with more contacts, and as individuals’ networks connect them to actors that are 
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do not observe sufficient variation in these dimensions to definitively test their implications we feel they 
help bound and contextualize our generalizations, and we provide some empirical evidence of their im-
portance in the discussion. 
Non-Linearity in Information Acquisition. Finally, it is unlikely that there are constant or increas-
ing returns to network size. The relationship between information diversity and network size is likely 
concave not only because there are costs to relationships, but also because in organizational networks, 
where the number of possible contacts is finite, there are natural constraints on the diversity of a network 
as it grows in size. While a greater number of contacts are likely to provide access to more diverse, non-
redundant information, the probability that an additional contact will have novel information is likely de-
creasing in the size of an individual’s network. This expectation is a direct result of our model and is also 
supported by prior empirical evidence on network formation. Social networks tend to cluster into homo-
philous cliques (for a review see McPherson, Smith-Loving, & Cook 2001). Since individuals usually 
make connections through contacts they already have, in bounded networks the likelihood that a marginal 
contact will be redundant should increase in the number of people already known.13 As actors establish 
relationships with a finite set of alters, the probability that a new relationship will be structurally non-
redundant should decrease as possible alters in the network are exhausted. We therefore expect that the 
marginal increase in information diversity is decreasing in network size. Part of the explanation for this 
limitation is that there exist natural constraints on network diversity in bounded organizational networks 
such that the marginal increase in network diversity is decreasing in network size. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
themselves unconnected and structurally non-equivalent, we expect the information they receive to be more diverse and we expect them to re-
ceive more total novel information as hypothesized. The second contingent factor is whether topics are uniformly or non-uniformly spread across 
the network. It follows from our theory and our model that if information is uniformly distributed, diverse contacts should not increase access to 
diverse information. This assumption lies at the heart of theories linking networks diversity to information advantages. Information turbulence 
provides the final contingent factor.  It represents the extent to which topics within T obsolesce and require ego to refresh information on any 
given topic in any pool.  Extreme turbulence, in which data obsolesce each period, favors seeking information diversity through a high bandwidth 
constrained-strong tie exclusively.  Since all information is necessarily new information, P[Ec] = P[ED] = 1, an ego always prefers the multiple 
samples provided by equation 2. 
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Access to Heterogeneous, Novel Information & Performance 
Access to more heterogeneous and novel information should promote stronger managerial per-
formance by enabling higher quality decisions, facilitating the development of managerial skills and pro-
viding a context for more effective political maneuverability. The most familiar benefit of access to in-
formation is improved decision making. Environmental awareness and knowledge of the variety of op-
tions available to a decision maker enables more optimal decisions (and actions) by increasing the accu-
racy of mental mappings from options or actions to expected consequences and outcomes (Marschak & 
Radner 1972). In the context of innovation, novel solutions outside localized social and intellectual 
spheres can enable new designs, products or solutions that cannot be generated from local knowledge 
(Burt 2004a). Some of the most groundbreaking innovations of this century have materialized through 
combinations of ideas from different disciplines (e.g. quantum computing, bioinformatics, nanotechnol-
ogy), and a good deal of research into social capital has focused on the innovation benefits to diverse 
novel information (e.g. Hargadon & Sutton 1997, Reagans & Zuckerman 2001, Burt 2004a, Rodan & 
Gallunic 2004, Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 2005, Lazer & Friedman 2005). 
Access to diverse novel information also enables skill development by increasing familiarity and 
facility with different topics, improving the breadth of individuals’ absorptive capacity and strengthening 
the ability to communicate across a wider array of subjects. As people are exposed to new ideas and in-
formation from a wide array of disciplines and topics, they are more able to absorb new ideas by associat-
ing them with what they already know. Developing the ability to absorb new ideas and concepts enables 
more effective knowledge transfer (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, Simon 1991) and makes it more likely that 
others will share more novel information with a given recipient (Reagans & McEvily 2003), reflecting the 
social selectivity of information sharing. As absorptive capacity is developed across a wider range of sub-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 We focus on internal networks due to difficulties in collecting reliable data outside the firm and in estimating accurate network structures 
without access to whole network data (see Barnes 1979, Marsden 1990). As Burt (1992: 172) demonstrates however “little evidence of hole ef-
fects [are] lost... when sociometric choices [are] restricted to relations within the firm.” 
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jects, individuals are better able to communicate ideas across a broader range of topics and to a broader 
audience, strengthening persuasion and the ability to generate broader support from subject matter experts 
in accomplishing managerial goals (Rodan & Galunic 2004). 
Finally, access to diverse information, representing the perspectives and knowledge of varied so-
cial groups can create autonomy (Simmel 1922 (1955), Burgelman 1991, Burt 1992) and enable political 
maneuverability (Padgett & Ansell 1993), helping individuals get access to resources they need to do their 
jobs efficiently (Rodan & Galunic 2004). We therefore expect access to non-redundant and diverse in-
formation is positively associated with recruiters’ performance.  
Diminishing Returns to Novel Information. The performance benefits of access to more diverse 
and novel information depend not only on the value of novel information to the decision maker, but also 
on the ability of the decision maker to process and use the information they receive. Limits to human 
cognitive capacity make us susceptible to information overload (Simon 1991). Receiving more informa-
tion should improve decision making to a point, after which new information may exceed the information 
processing capacity of the decision maker creating confusion, making information more difficult to find 
or recall and reducing the value of new information for decision quality and performance (Galbriath 1974, 
Tushman & Nadler 1978). Several theoretical results from information economics also predict non-
linearities in the value of information. Arrow (1985) demonstrates that expected payoffs from decisions 
about uncertain events are concave in the amount of information the decision maker obtains, implying 
diminishing returns to more information. As measured by decision relevance, value only increases when 
new information leads to different and better decisions (Arrow 1985, Hirshleifer 1973). Information is 
novel if it provides an alternate perspective on a known topic or knowledge of an altogether new topic. As 
new information on known topics accumulates, beliefs tend to converge on a particular view of the world, 
making further confirmation unnecessary. Expected convergence under Bayes' Rule, for example, exhib-
its clear diminishing returns such that, beyond some threshold, more news has no more value. As new 
information on new topics accumulates, value is also likely to exhibit diminishing marginal returns due to 
decision irrelevance. As actors’ information space becomes disparate, ideas are less likely to connect in 
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complementary ways and each bit of information is less likely to be relevant to the space of decisions and 
actions the actor is interested in. We find evidence of diminishing returns to novel information in our own 
analytical model. Collectively, these arguments suggest a non-linear relationship between access to more 
novel information and performance. We therefore expect that the marginal increase in performance asso-
ciated with access to novel information is decreasing in the amount of novel information actors receive. 
Alternative Mechanisms Linking Network Diversity & Performance. Other mechanisms could 
also explain the observed relationship between network diversity and performance. Network contacts 
could provide resources other than information (e.g. Podolny & Barron 1997), there could be power or 
control benefits to network structure independent of information flows (e.g. Burt 1992), and structural 
diversity could reduce dependence, place individuals in favorable trading relationships (e.g. Emerson 
1962) or entitle them to benefits from informal reciprocity (e.g. Cook, Emerson & Gilmore 1983). These 
alternate mechanisms could also explain the link between structural diversity and performance without 
any prediction concerning actors’ information access.  While we expect network structure to impact per-
formance through its effects on access to diverse and novel information, these other intermediate mecha-
nisms could also tie network diversity to performance. We therefore expect that network diversity is posi-
tively associated with performance, controlling for access to novel information. 
----- TABLE 1 ----- 
Empirical Setting – Executive Recruiting 
To explore the information mechanisms that govern the creation of social capital, we identified a 
firm in an information intensive industry in which employees rely heavily on social information seeking 
through email communication. We studied a medium-sized executive recruiting firm with fourteen offices 
across the United States. As work was geographically dispersed and as recruiters relied heavily on email 
to seek information and coordinate tasks, we focused on analyzing the content of communication flowing 
in email networks. As one recruiter reported “[s]taff spend an enormous amount of time coordinating. We 
are big users of email,” giving us confidence that our data cover a substantial portion of communication 
 
 
 23
traffic in the firm.14 The email network of the firm displays a hub and spoke structure, with a dense core 
of thirty four recruiters at the firm’s headquarters, and spokes in thirteen other offices located across the 
United States. The network of recruiters located at the headquarters is highly clustered (Clustering Coef-
ficient = 25.32) and dense (Mean Density = 11.02, SD = 32.44) compared to the firm as a whole (Cluster-
ing Coefficient = 12.20; Mean Density = 5.41 (19.08).15 There are two medium sized offices of six and 
seven recruiters each, with the rest comprised of one, two or three recruiters per office. This structure of-
fers a unique window onto the value of network and information diversity as measured in email data, as 
geographic dispersion makes email a critical source of information.  
----- FIGURE 2 ----- 
Our interviews revealed that the core of executive recruiters’ work involves matching job candi-
dates to clients’ requirements; a process which is information-intensive and requires activities geared to-
ward assembling, analyzing, and making decisions based on information gathered from team members, 
other firm employees, and contacts outside the firm. Access to information enables higher quality deci-
sions in this setting. Recruiters report being more effective when they receive rich information from their 
colleagues about candidate qualifications, circumventing screening barriers, handling difficult place-
ments, and team coordination.16 Although recruiters also rely on databases and resumes to make deci-
sions, social information seeking is critical to success. One recruiter told us that “[i]n meetings you’ll hear 
‘Oh he looks good on paper, but he’s an idiot,’ or ‘go talk to Simon about her,” implying the importance 
of verifying what’s “on paper” through social information exchanges with colleagues who have particular 
expertise or knowledge. Even subtle things such as a candidate’s appearance can affect the likelihood of a 
successful match: “Mary has two inch nails. She doesn’t present well in the LA market.” In this case the 
                                                          
14 Although we did not collect phone conversation data or face to face information exchanges, our parameter estimates should be downward 
biased by the lack of such data, making statistically significant relationships between networks, information and performance more difficult to 
observe. 
15 The Clustering Coefficient is the number of ties divided by the total number of possible ties that could exist (Watts & Strogatz 1998). The 
mean density is the average of the number of ties divided by the number of pairs in each ego network. 
16 We conducted interviews over the course of a year beginning in October 2001. 
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recruiter conducting the search needed to seek information from colleagues with expertise on how a can-
didate’s appearance might be perceived in the LA market. As another recruiter put it “[m]uch of the hu-
man data is private, never captured in the [corporate] database.  It stays in my head.” Even when the data-
base contains relevant information, social verification is important because “[p]eople move or get pro-
moted. [It is therefore best to] assume the database is 60% accurate.” 
Sharing procedural information can also improve efficiency and effectiveness (Szulanski 1996). 
For example, information exchanged through social communication helps recruiters navigate entry into 
client firms and candidate pools. One recruiter told us that “[c]all penetration can be really hard into pri-
vate companies so researchers and consultants swap information to get through.” Information sharing also 
enables coordination and eliminates the need for recruiters to ‘reinvent the wheel’ when they are search-
ing for similar candidates or clients: “Communication within and across teams is a big success factor. It 
eliminates double work.” In these ways, information helps recruiters fill different types of positions and 
perform complex matching of candidate strengths and weaknesses to client wants and needs. 
Diverse and novel information is particularly useful in executive recruiting. Qualitative studies 
have shown that recruiters fill “brokerage positions” between clients and candidates and rely heavily on 
information flows to complete their work effectively (Finlay & Coverdill 2000). Information about a di-
verse pool of candidates, diverse markets and diverse client firms reduces time wasted interviewing un-
suitable candidates and increases the quality of placement decisions by improving the fit between candi-
dates and clients’ requirements (Aral et. al. 2006). Recruiters report that tapping diverse information 
pools helps them do their work effectively. They emphasize the need for diverse contacts and report that 
“[d]iversity means more and better contacts” because “[s]kill sets are complementary and not perfectly 
overlapping.” While interviewing recruiters, we also talked with several executive recruiter trainers. One 
trainer, who describes her job as ‘helping recruiters learn to be better recruiters,’ told us that “[To be a 
successful recruiter one should] develop relationships with people you don’t know… Some folks join 
groups for their prestige but you should join clubs for their diversity. Whom do you what to know? Go 
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there. Neophytes hang out on their own.” For these reasons we expect diverse and novel information to be 
particularly important for explaining variance in recruiter performance. 
The process for executing a recruiting contract is relatively standard: A partner secures a contract 
with a client and assembles a project team (team size mean = 1.9, min = 1, max = 5). The team then estab-
lishes a universe of potential candidates including those in similar positions at other firms and those 
drawn from the firm’s internal database of resumes and other leads.17 Candidates are vetted on the basis of 
perceived quality, their match with the job description and other factors. After conducting initial due dili-
gence, the team chooses a subset of candidates for internal interviews, approximately six of which are 
forwarded to the client along with detailed background information, notes and a formal report of the 
team’s due diligence. The team then facilitates the client’s interviews with each candidate, and the client, 
if satisfied with the pool, makes offers to one or more candidates.  A contract is considered complete 
when a candidate accepts an offer. 
Recruiters generate revenue on the basis of completed contracts. Therefore, the speed with which 
vacancies are filled is an important intermediate measure of workers’ productivity. Contract completion 
implies that recruiters have met a client’s minimum thresholds of candidate fit and quality and “[t]he 
longer a client delays, the lower the probability of job acceptance.” Project duration can therefore be in-
terpreted as a quality controlled measure of productivity. In assessing individual recruiters’ performance, 
we measure revenues generated per month, projects completed per month and average project duration 
per month. Effective recruiters rely on being “in the know” and delivering candidates with professional 
and personal attributes that fit client needs. To accomplish this, recruiters must interact with several dif-
ferent information channels to match candidates’ attributes with clients’ requirements. We therefore ex-
pect recruiters with diverse, non-redundant information to complete more projects, to complete projects 
faster, and to generate more revenue for the firm per unit time. 
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Methods 
 By analyzing email communication patterns and message content, we are able to match informa-
tion channels to the subject matter of the content flowing through them. Our empirical approach also ad-
dresses a methodological puzzle that has historically troubled network research. In traditional network 
studies, a fundamental tradeoff exists between comprehensive observation of whole networks and the ac-
curacy of respondents’ recall. Most research elicits network data from respondents who have difficulty 
recalling their networks (e.g. Bernard et. al 1981), especially among individuals socially distant to them-
selves (Krackhardt & Kilduff 1999). The inaccuracy of respondent recall and the bias associated with re-
call at social distance creates inaccurate estimates of network variables (Kumbasar, Romney & Batchelder 
1994), forcing most empirical studies to artificially limit the boundary of estimated networks to local ar-
eas around respondents (e.g. Reagans & McEvily 2003). Such empirical strategies create estimation chal-
lenges due to the sensitivity of network metrics to the completeness of data (Marsden 1990). If important 
areas of the network are not captured, estimates of network positions can be biased. Furthermore, as our 
content measures consider the similarity of topics across the entire network, poor coverage of the firm 
could bias our estimates of the relative novelty or diversity of topics discussed via email. We therefore 
take several steps to ensure a high level of participation (described below). As 87% of eligible recruiters 
agreed to participate, and given that our inability to observe the remaining 13% is limited to messages 
between two employees who both opted out of the study, we collect email network and individual content 
data with nearly full coverage of the firm and there are no statistical differences between participants and 
those who opted out on dimensions of relevance to the study.18  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 We have also studied executive recruiters’ use of information contained in the firm’s internal database or ‘Executive Search System.’ For 
more detailed analyses on how use of the Executive Search System impacts performance see Aral et. al. (2006). 
18 F-tests comparing performance levels of those who opted out with those who remained did not show statistically significant differences.  F 
(Sig): Rev02 2.295 (.136), Comp02 .837 (.365), Multitasking .386 (.538). 
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Data 
Our data come from four sources: (i) detailed accounting records of individual project assign-
ments and performance, (ii) email data captured directly from the corporate server, (iii) survey data on 
demographic characteristics, human capital and information seeking behaviors, and (iv) data from the 
web site Wikipedia.org used to validate our analytical models of information diversity. The firm gave us 
access to their complete internal accounting and project databases for records spanning 2000 to 2005. In-
ternal accounting project data describe: revenues generated by individual recruiters, contract start and stop 
dates, projects handled simultaneously by each recruiter, project team composition, and job levels of re-
cruiters and placed candidates. These provide excellent performance measures that can be normalized for 
quality. Email data cover 10 months of complete email history at the firm. The data were captured from 
the corporate mail server during two equal periods from October 1, 2002 to March 1, 2003 and from Oc-
tober 1, 2003 to March 1, 2004.  Participants received $100 in exchange for permitting use of their data, 
resulting in 87% coverage of eligible recruiters and more than 125,000 email messages captured. 19 De-
tails of email data collection are described by Aral, Brynjolfsson & Van Alstyne (2006). The third data set 
contains survey responses on demographic and human capital variables such as age, education, industry 
experience, and information-seeking behaviors. Survey questions were generated from a review of rele-
vant literature and interviews with recruiters. Experts in survey methods at the Inter-University Consor-
tium for Political and Social Science Research vetted the survey instrument, which was then pre-tested for 
comprehension and ease-of-use. Individual participants received $25 for completed surveys and participa-
tion exceeded 85%. The fourth dataset is a set of 291 entries collected from Wikipedia.org, which we de-
scribe in detail in the section pertaining to the validity of our information diversity metrics (see Appendix 
                                                          
19 We wrote and developed email capture software specific to this project and took multiple steps to maximize data integrity. New code was 
tested at Microsoft Research Labs for server load, accuracy and completeness of message capture, and security exposure. To account for differ-
ences in user deletion patterns, we set administrative controls to prevent data expunging for 24 hours. The project went through nine months of 
human subjects review and content was masked using cryptographic techniques to preserve privacy (see Van Alstyne & Zhang 2003). Spam 
messages were excluded by eliminating external contacts who did not receive at least one message from someone inside the firm. 
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C). Descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables are provided in Tables 2 & 3 (we provide details 
on the construction of each variable in the next section). An observation is a person-month. 
----- TABLE 2 ----- 
----- TABLE 3 ----- 
Variable Construction 
Network Structure 
Network Size. The size of i’s network (Si) is simply the number of contacts with whom i ex-
changes at least one message. Size is the most familiar network characteristic related to information bene-
fits and is a good proxy for a variety of characteristics, like degree centrality, betweenness centrality and 
network reach, which describe the breadth and range of actors’ networks (see Burt 1992: 12). In our data, 
network size is significantly correlated with degree centrality (ρ = .70; p < .001), betweeness centrality (ρ 
= .77; p < .001), and reach (ρ = .56; p < .001), demonstrating its value as a proxy for network breadth.  
Network Diversity. Network diversity describes the degree to which contacts are structurally 
‘non-redundant,’ and there are both first order and second order dimensions of redundancy as shown in 
Figure 3. Individuals who are in contact are likely to share information and be aware of the same oppor-
tunities, ideas and expertise. Networks in which contacts are highly connected are termed ‘cohesive.’ 
Contacts that are themselves connected to the same people are termed ‘structurally equivalent.’ We meas-
ure redundancy in the first order by the lack of constraint in actors’ networks, and in the second order by 
the average structural equivalence of actors’ contacts.20 We define the constraint iC (Burt 1992: 55)21 of 
an actor’s network as the degree to which an individual’s contacts are connected to each other, such 
that ,
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qjiqiji pppC  jiq ,≠ ; and the structural diversity iD of an actor’s network as iC−1 . We 
use the standard definition of the structural equivalence of two actors, measured as the Euclidean distance 
                                                          
20 By measuring both first and second order network diversity we account for the possibility that small world networks (Watts 1999), clustered 
cliques linked by infrequent weak ties, could bring novel information into a cohesive clique from contacts two steps removed from ego. 
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of their contact vectors.22 By measuring both first and second order network diversity we account for the 
possibility that small world networks, cohesive cliques linked by infrequent weak ties, could bring novel 
information into a clique 
 Knowledge Heterogeneity. We measure the knowledge heterogeneity of employee’s contacts by 
evaluating the diversity of their expertise. In this setting recruiters’ develop expertise as they complete 
projects of different types. As there is little in the way of formal training to become an executive recruiter, 
we do not use recruiters’ educational backgrounds but rather the distributions of their prior project experi-
ence over project types to measure knowledge heterogeneity. The firm categorizes projects into the fol-
lowing categories: CEO, COO, CIO, Medical Executive, Human Resources Executive, Business Devel-
opment Executive and ‘Other.’ We use these categories as the relevant areas of recruiters’ expertise.23 The 
Knowledge Heterogeneity variable is constructed using a Herfindahl Index of the expertise of an actor’s 
contacts in each month, weighted by the strength of the tie to each alter. As the firm records each em-
ployee’s effort share on each project, the expertise of a recruiter is share weighted by the amount of effort 
they recorded against any given project in the accounting data. The measure is constructed as follows: 
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represents the total amount of prior experience in i’s network in project 
class k, weighted by the strength of the tie to each of i’s contacts ijw  (the number of messages exchanged 
between i and j) and summed over all of i’s contacts j. jkP  represents j’s prior experience in job class k, 
where P is an effort share weighted count of the number of projects of class k that j has completed. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Where p
ij
 +∑p
iq
p
qj
 measures the proportion of i’s network contacts that directly or indirectly involve j and C
i
 sums this across all of i’s 
contacts. 
22 Euclidean distance measures the square root of the sum of squared distances between two contact vectors, or the degree to which contacts are 
connected to the same people. We measure the average structural equivalence of actors’ direct contacts. 
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denominator, ∑
=
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9
1k
iki qq represents the total project experience in i’s network summed over all project 
classes. Thus, the ratio ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
i
ik
q
q
is the share of prior experience in project class k over the total project ex-
perience in i’s network. We then construct a Herfindahl Index of this ratio measuring the concentration of 
expertise across job classes among i’s contacts. To measure heterogeneity rather than concentration we 
subtract this measure of project experience concentration from one. As the expertise in i’s network be-
comes more concentrated in a few project classes, the knowledge heterogeneity measure decreases.24 
Reagans & McEvily (2003) construct a similar measure of ‘expertise overlap,’ although our measure uses 
accounting records to record project experience (rather than self reports of expertise), and weights the 
expertise in an employee’s network by the strength of their tie and the effort share of each alter on each 
project. Our measure of knowledge heterogeneity also changes over time as recruiters complete more pro-
jects of different types. 
 Channel Bandwidth. Bandwidth measures the volume of communication over a given channel. 
We record the average message traffic per communication channel or tie, operationalized as the amount 
of incoming email over the total number of contacts (the size of the actor’s network) at time t: 
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----- FIGURE 3 ----- 
 
Non-Network Determinants of Information Advantage 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
23 We also ran specification controlling for other categorization schemes and sub-categories of ‘Other’ jobs clustered by their project descrip-
tions, which returned similar results. We therefore retained the firm’s original classification.  
24 To normalize the Knowledge Heterogeneity measure so that its values range from zero to one, we scale the measure by multiplying the final 
metric by (9/8), creating this final metric: 
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. This scaling does not affect the distribution of the measure or the out-
come of any of our analyses. It simply allows the measure to range from zero to one. 
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 Several other factors could affect access to diverse information and individual performance other 
than our variables of interest. We therefore examine five possible alternative explanations for information 
advantage: demography, human capital, total communication volume, unobservable individual character-
istics and temporal shocks to the flow of information in the firm. 
Demography. That demography could influence performance, learning capabilities and the vari-
ety of ideas to which individuals have access has been well documented (e.g. Pfeffer 1983, Ancona & 
Caldwell 1992, Reagans & Zuckerman 2001). Older employees may have prior related knowledge on a 
wider variety of topics or may be more aware of experts in the organization. Employment discrimination 
and interpersonal difference could also impact the relative performance and information seeking and shar-
ing habits of men and women. We therefore control for the age and gender of employees. 
Human Capital. Greater industry experience, education or individuals’ organizational status could 
also create variation in access to diverse and novel information and performance. As individuals gain ex-
perience, they may collect expertise across several domains, reflected in communications across multiple 
subjects or topics. It could also be that as individuals gain experience, they specialize and focus their 
work and their communication on a limited number of topics. We therefore control for the level of educa-
tion, industry experience measured by the number of years employees have worked in executive recruit-
ing, and organizational position. As employees occupy one of three positions in the firm – partner, con-
sultant or researcher – we include dummy variables for each of these positions to account for authority 
and status differentials that could explain variation in both access to information and performance. 
Total Communication Volume. We are interested both in the total amount of novel information 
and the importance of network structure holding communication volume constant. Other studies have 
demonstrated the importance of controlling for communication volume to isolate the effects of structural 
variables (e.g. Cummings & Cross 2003). We therefore control for total email communication. 
Individual Characteristics & Temporal Shocks. Some employees may simply be more social or 
more ambitious, creating variation in information seeking habits and performance. To control for unob-
servable individual characteristics we test fixed effects specifications of each of our hypotheses. At the 
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same time, temporal shocks could affect demand for the firm’s services and subsequent information seek-
ing activities associated with more work. In our data, business exhibits seasonal variation. Demand for the 
firm’s services picks up sharply in January and declines steadily through the next eight months. These 
exogenous shocks to demand could drive simultaneous increases in project workload, information seeking 
and revenue generation creating a spurious correlation between information flows and output. There could 
also be non-seasonal transitory shocks to demand in a given year or a given month of a given year. For 
this reason, we control for both seasonal and transitory variation in our data with dummy variables for 
each month and year. 
 
Modeling Information Heterogeneity: A Vector Space Model of Communication Content 
 We model and measure the diversity of information in individuals’ email using a Vector Space 
Model of the topics present in email content (e.g. Salton et. al. 1975).25 Vector Space Models are widely 
used in information retrieval and search query optimization algorithms to identify documents that are 
similar to each other or pertain to topics identified by search terms. They represent textual content as vec-
tors of topics in multidimensional space based on the relative prevalence of topic keywords. In our model, 
each email is represented as a multidimensional ‘topic vector’ whose elements are the frequencies of key-
words in the email. The prevalence of certain keywords indicates that a topic that corresponds to those 
keywords is being discussed. For example, an email about pets might include frequent mentions of the 
words “dog,” “cat,” and “veterinarian;” while an email about statistics might mention the words “vari-
ance,” “specification,” and “heteroskedasticity.” The relative topic similarity of two emails can then be 
assessed by topic vector convergence or divergence – the degree to which the vectors point in the same or 
                                                          
25 While email is not the only source of employees’ communication, it is one of the most pervasive media that preserves content. It is also a good 
proxy for other social sources of information in organizations where email is widely used. In our data, the average number of contacts by phone 
(ρ= .30, p < .01) and instant messenger (ρ = .15, p < .01) are positively and significantly correlated with email contacts. Our interviews indicate 
that in our firm, email is a primary communication media. 
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orthogonal directions.26  To measure content diversity, we characterize all emails as topic vectors and 
measure the variance or spread of topic vectors in individuals’ inboxes and outboxes. Emails about simi-
lar topics contain similar language on average, and vectors used to represent them are therefore closer in 
multidimensional space, reducing their collective variance or spread. 
Construction of Topic Vectors & Keyword Selection. Vector Space Models characterize docu-
ments iD  by keywords jk weighted according to their frequency of use (or with 0 weights for words ex-
cluded from the analysis – called “stop words”). Each document is represented as an n-dimensional vector 
of keywords in topic space, 
),...,,( 21 iniii kkkD = , 
where ijk  represents the weight of the jth keyword. 
----- FIGURE 4 ----- 
Weights define the degree to which a particular keyword impacts the vector characterization of a docu-
ment. Words that discriminate topics are weighted more heavily than words less useful in distinguishing 
topics. As terms that appear frequently in a document are typically thematic and relate to the document’s 
subject matter, we use the ‘term frequency’ of keywords in email as weights to construct topic vectors and 
refine our keyword selection with criteria designed to select words that distinguish and represent topics.27 
 In order to minimize their impact on the clustering process, we initialized our data by removing 
common “stop words,” such as “a, “an,” “the,” “and,” and other common words with high frequency 
across all emails that are likely to create noise in content measures. We then implemented an iterative, k-
means clustering algorithm to group emails into clusters that use the same words, similar words or words 
                                                          
26 Each email may pertain to multiple topics based on keyword prevalence, and topic vectors representing emails can emphasize one topic more 
than another based on the relative frequencies of keywords associated with different topics. In this way, our framework captures nuances of 
emails that may pertain to several topics of differing emphasis. 
27 Another common weighting scheme is the ‘term-frequency/inverse-document frequency.’ However, we use a more sophisticated keyword 
selection refinement method specific to this dataset described in detail in the remainder this section. 
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that frequently appeared together.28 The result of iterative k-means clustering is a series of assignments of 
emails to clusters based on their language similarity. Rather than imposing exogenous keywords on the 
topic space, we extract topic keywords likely to characterize topics by using a series of algorithms guided 
by three basic principles.  
First, in order to identify distinct topics in our corpus, keywords should distinguish topics from 
one another. We therefore chose keywords that maximize the variance of their mean frequencies across k-
means clusters. This refinement favors words with widely differing mean frequencies across clusters, re-
taining words with an ability to distinguish between topics. In our data, we find the coefficient of varia-
tion of the mean frequencies across topics to be a good indicator of this dispersion.29 
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Second, keywords should represent the topics they are intended to identify. In other words, key-
words identifying a given topic should frequently appear in emails about that topic. To achieve this goal 
we chose keywords that minimize the mean frequency variance within clusters, favoring words that are 
consistently used across emails discussing a particular topic:30 
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Third, keywords should not occur too infrequently. Infrequent keywords will not represent or dis-
tinguish topics and will create sparse topic vectors that are difficult to compare. We therefore selected 
                                                          
28 K-means clustering generates clusters by locally optimizing the mean squared distance of all documents in a corpus. The algorithm first cre-
ates an initial set of clusters based on language similarities, computes the ‘centriod’ of each cluster, and then reassigns documents to clusters 
whose centriod is the closest to that document in topic space. The algorithm stops iterating when no reassignment is performed or when the objec-
tive function falls below a pre-specified threshold. 
29 The coefficient of variation is particularly useful due to its scale invariance, enabling comparisons of datasets, like ours, with heterogeneous 
mean values (Ancona & Caldwell 1992). To ease computation we use the square of the coefficient of variation, which produces a monotonic 
transformation of the coefficient without affecting our keyword selection.  
30 i indexes emails and c indexes k-means clusters. We squared the variation to ease computation as in footnote 28. 
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high frequency words (not eliminated by the “stop word” list of common words) that maximize the inter-
topic coefficient of variation and minimize intra-topic mean frequency variation. This process generated 
topical keywords from usage characteristics of the email communication of employees at our site.31  
Measures of Information Diversity. Using the keywords generated by our usage analysis, we 
populated topic vectors representing the subject matter of the emails in our data. We then measured the 
degree to which the emails in an individual employee’s inbox or outbox were focused or diverse by 
measuring the spread or variance of their topic vectors. We created five separate diversity measurement 
specifications based on techniques from the information retrieval, document similarity and information 
theory literatures (see Appendix B for detailed descriptions of each measure). The approach of all five 
measures is to compare individuals’ emails to each other, and to characterize the degree to which emails 
are about a set of focused topics, or rather about a wider set of diverse topics. We used two common 
document similarity measures (Cosine similarity and Dice’s coefficient) and three measures enhanced by 
an information theoretic weighting of emails based on their “information content.”32 We performed exten-
sive validation tests of our diversity measures and their correlations, including application to an inde-
pendent dataset from Wikipedia. A detailed description of the validation process and results appears in 
Appendix C. As all diversity measures are highly correlated (~ corr = .98; see Appendix B), our specifica-
tions use the average cosine distance of employees’ incoming email topic vectors Iijd from the mean vec-
tor of their topic space IiM  to represent incoming information diversity (
I
iID ): 
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31 We conducted sensitivity analysis of our keyword selection process by choosing different thresholds at which to select words based on our 
criteria and found results were robust to all specifications and generated keyword sets more precise than those used in traditional term 
frequency/inverse document frequency weighted vector space models that do not refine keyword selection. 
32 Information Content is used to describe how informative a word or phrase is based on its level of abstraction. Formally, the information 
content of a concept c is quantified as its negative log likelihood –log p(c). 
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This measure aggregates the cosine distance of email vectors in an inbox from the mean topic vector of 
that inbox, approximating the spread or variance of topics in incoming email for a given individual. We 
measure the total amount of i’s incoming email communication as a count of incoming email messages, 
∑= j jiIi mE , where mji represents a message sent from j to i; and the total amount of non-redundant 
information flowing to each actor i )( IiNRI as diversity times total incoming email: )*(
I
i
I
i
I
i IDENRI = . 
 
Model Specifications 
We began by examining the structural determinants of access to diverse and novel information. 
We first estimated an equation relating network structure to the diversity of information flowing into ac-
tors’ email inboxes using pooled OLS and fixed and random effects models on monthly panels of indi-
viduals’ networks and information diversity.33 The estimating equation is specified as follows: 
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        [5], 
where IitID  represents the diversity of the information in a given individual’s inbox, 
I
itE  represents the 
total number of incoming messages received by i, itNS  represents the size of i’s network, 
2
itNS  repre-
sents network size squared, itND  represents network diversity (measured by one minus constraint), itSE  
represents average structural equivalence, itKH  represents the knowledge heterogeneity of i’s contacts, 
itB  represents channel bandwidth, ji
j
j HC∑β  represents controls for human capital and demographic 
                                                          
33 We focus in this paper on incoming information for two reasons. First, we expect network structure to influence incoming information more 
than outgoing information. Second, the theory we intend to test is about the information to which individuals have access as a result of their 
network structure, not the information individuals send. These dimensions are highly correlated. 
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variables (Age, Gender, Education, Industry Experience, and Managerial Level), and it
m
m M∑β  repre-
sents temporal controls for each month/year. 
We then examined the relationship between network structure and the total amount of novel in-
formation flowing into actors’ email inboxes ( IitNRI ), again testing pooled OLS and fixed and random 
effects specifications using the following model: 
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            [6]. 
To explore the mechanisms driving the creation and appropriation of information advantages 
from network structure we explicitly considered a) the tradeoff between network diversity and channel 
bandwidth, b) whether diverse networks provide access to contacts with heterogeneous knowledge and c) 
whether a non-linear relationship between network size and network diversity could explain why the mar-
ginal increase in information diversity is decreasing in network size. To test these intermediate mecha-
nisms we specified the following two equations.  
it
m
itmji
j
jitititiit MBHCBKHNSNSND εβββγ ++++++= ∑∑3221                  [7]. 
If the probability of contact redundancy is increasing in network size (implying that network diversity is 
bounded in organizational networks of finite size), we should see a non-linear positive relationship be-
tween network size and structural diversity, such that the marginal increase in structural diversity is de-
creasing in network size. 
To explore the relationship between network diversity and channel bandwidth, and to test whether 
diverse networks are associated with lower channel bandwidth, we specified the model expressed in equa-
tion [8]. If network diversity is associated with lower channel bandwidth, we would expect to observe 
parameter estimates such that 01 <β  and 02 >β .  
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m
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 38
Finally, we tested the relationship between non-redundant information ( IitNRI ) and performance 
( itP ), and included our measure of structural network diversity ( itND ) in the specification. 
( ) it
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If information benefits to network diversity exist, network diversity should be positively associ-
ated with access to diverse and non-redundant information, and non-redundant information should be 
positively associated with performance. If network diversity confers additional benefits beyond informa-
tion advantage (such as power or favorable trading conditions) network diversity should contribute to per-
formance beyond its contribution through information diversity.34 Finally, if there are diminishing returns 
to novel information, we should see a concave relationship between novel information and productivity. 
As a robustness check we also estimated equation [9] replacing the non-redundant information variable 
( IitNRI ) with incoming information diversity (
I
itID ). 
We estimate relationships between network structure and information access, and between infor-
mation access and performance using panel data. We are interested in how variation in network structure 
explains performance differentials across individuals, and also in how changes in actors’ networks explain 
variation in their own performance over time. If network structure generates social capital by influencing 
information access, actors with larger, more diverse networks with higher channel bandwidth should re-
ceive more novel information and perform better than their counterparts. However, evidence of variation 
across individuals cannot exclude the possibility that unobservable characteristics of individuals, such as 
ambition or social intelligence, could simultaneously drive variation in network diversity and perform-
ance. If unobserved characteristics of individuals are correlated with the error terms in our models, pooled 
OLS estimation will produce biased parameter estimates. We therefore examine variation within and 
                                                          
34 We were unable to reject the hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity and report standard errors according to the White correction (White 1980). 
White’s approach is conservative. Estimated coefficients are unbiased but not efficient. In small samples, we may observe low t-statistics even 
when variables exert a real influence. As there may be idiosyncratic error at the level of individuals, for OLS analyses we report robust standard 
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across individuals over time using both fixed effects and random effects models to control for bias created 
by this unobserved heterogeneity and to examine variation within and across observations of individuals 
over time. The statistical procedures used to estimate our specifications are detailed in Appendix D. 
 
Results 
Network Structure & Access to Diverse, Non-Redundant Information 
We first estimated the relationships between network size, network diversity, knowledge hetero-
geneity, channel bandwidth and access to diverse information controlling for demographic factors, human 
capital, unobservable individual characteristics, temporal shocks and total communication volume in hier-
archical regressions, adding variables to the specification in succession (see Table 4 Models 1-6).  
----- TABLE 4 ----- 
The knowledge heterogeneity of recruiters’ contacts is positively correlated with the diversity of 
the information they receive in both pair wise correlations (.23 p < .05, see Table 3) and regression results 
(see Table 4 Models 1-2). When network size is added to regression models, the magnitude of the positive 
association between knowledge heterogeneity and information diversity decreases from .28 to .12, indi-
cating that as recruiters add network contacts the heterogeneity of their contacts’ expertise increases, with 
size accounting for some of the variation in information diversity originally attributed to knowledge het-
erogeneity. Controlling for network size and total communication volume, a one standard deviation in-
crease in the knowledge heterogeneity of recruiters’ contacts is associated with a .12 standard deviation 
increase in incoming information diversity (Model 2, p < .01). Table 4 Models 2-6 all demonstrate that 
the diversity of information flowing to an actor is increasing in the actor’s network size and network di-
versity, while the marginal increase in information diversity is decreasing in network size, supporting hy-
potheses 1 and 4a. A one standard deviation increase in the size of recruiters’ networks (approximately 8 
additional contacts) is associated with a 1.2 standard deviation increase in information diversity (Model 2, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
errors clustered by individual. Clustered robust standard errors are robust to correlations within observations of each individual, but are never 
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p < .01); while the coefficient on network size squared is negative and significant indicating diminishing 
marginal diversity returns to network size.35 As actors add network contacts, the contribution to informa-
tion diversity lessens, implying that information benefits to network size are constrained. Network diver-
sity is also positively and significantly associated with greater information diversity in incoming email. 
The first order diversity variable which measures the lack of constraint in an actor’s network is highly 
significant in all specifications, while the average structural equivalence of actors’ contacts does not in-
fluence access to diverse information controlling for network size and first order structural diversity.36 
These results demonstrate that large diverse networks provide access to diverse, novel sets of information. 
When the network diversity and structural equivalence terms are added to the estimation (Models 3), the 
positive contribution of knowledge heterogeneity to incoming information diversity disappears, implying 
that network diversity and knowledge heterogeneity are positively correlated and that network diversity is 
a stronger predictor of access to diverse information than the knowledge heterogeneity of recruiters’ con-
tacts. A one standard deviation increase in network diversity is associated with ~ .15 standard deviation 
increase in incoming information diversity. Finally, channel bandwidth is associated with access to more 
diverse information, confirming hypothesis H3b. A one standard deviation increase in channel bandwidth 
is associated with a .085 standard deviation increase in information diversity (p < .01). When channel 
bandwidth is added to the specification (Model 4), the magnitude of the estimated relationship between 
network diversity and information diversity increases implying a negative correlation between network 
diversity and channel bandwidth – providing preliminary evidence of a tradeoff between the two. Random 
effects specifications mirror the results of fixed effects specifications and demonstrate that traditional 
demographic and human capital factors have little effect on access to diverse information (see Model 6). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
fully efficient. They are conservative estimates of standard errors. 
35 We also tested a negative exponential specification of this relationship with very similar results. Both models fit well. 
36 Structural equivalence does have a positive and significant correlation with access to diverse information when the network diversity variable 
is left out of the estimation. 
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We then tested relationships between network size, network diversity, knowledge heterogeneity, 
channel bandwidth and the total amount of novel information that accrues to recruiters in incoming email. 
Our results, shown in Table 4 Models 7-12, demonstrate that the amount of novel information flowing to 
an actor is increasing in the actor’s network size, network diversity and channel bandwidth. Knowledge 
heterogeneity has a strong positive relationship with total non-redundant information (Model 7, p < .01)), 
until the network diversity and structural equivalence variables are added to the specification (Model 8) 
again demonstrating that network diversity is a stronger predictor of access to diverse novel information. 
Network diversity also has a strong positive relationship with the total amount of novel information flow-
ing into actors’ inboxes (Model 8, p < .01), but is not significant when controlling for network size (Mod-
els 9). The impact of size on total novel information dominates that of structural diversity because the 
total non-redundant information variable takes into account the volume of novel information, which in-
creases significantly as the total number of contacts increases. Channel bandwidth is also a strong predic-
tor of the volume of novel information (Model 10), with a one standard deviation increase in bandwidth 
associated with a .35 standard deviation increase in total novel information received (p < .01). These re-
sults highlight the importance of information flows over time. The amount of novel information flowing 
in networks of similar structural diversity is greater in larger networks with greater bandwidth. As net-
work size and the thickness of channels increase, the total volume of novel information flowing into re-
cruiters’ inboxes also increases. These results also demonstrate the importance of considering channel 
bandwidth (and the relationship between network diversity and channel bandwidth) when estimating rela-
tionships between network structure and access to diverse novel information. Bandwidth seems to trade-
off with network diversity and has a strong positive relationship with incoming information diversity and 
total non-redundant information. The random effects models again mirror the results of fixed effects 
specifications, demonstrating that demographic and human capital factors have little effect on the amount 
of novel information recruiters receive. We would also expect network diversity to drive greater access to 
total non-redundant information, controlling for network size. However, our model and results imply that 
while structural diversity has a strong impact on the diversity of the information actors receive (per unit of 
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information), variation in the total amount of novel information received is determined mostly by network 
size and channel bandwidth, again drawing attention to the thickness of communication channels and the 
number of contacts in providing novel information. These results also suggest nuanced relationships be-
tween network diversity, network size and channel bandwidth, which we explore in detail in the next sec-
tion. 
 
Tradeoffs between Network Size, Network Diversity & Channel Bandwidth 
Our model and prior research demonstrating a positive correspondence between weak ties and di-
verse networks lead us to predict a tradeoff between network diversity and channel bandwidth (the thick-
ness of communication channels as measured by communication volume per channel). Our parameter 
estimates in Table 4 present some initial evidence of this tradeoff as the inclusion of the bandwidth vari-
able increases the magnitude of the positive relationship between network diversity and information di-
versity, indicating that the exclusion of bandwidth downward biases parameter estimates of the relation-
ship between network diversity and access to diverse information. In Table 5 Models 1-5, we explicitly 
test the tradeoff between network diversity and channel bandwidth holding the size of networks constant. 
There is a strong negative relationship between network diversity and channel bandwidth (β  = -.314, p < 
.01) and a positive relationship between structural equivalence and channel bandwidth (β  = .107, p < 
.10), indicating that as networks become more diverse the thickness of communication channels narrows. 
These results hold even when we control for network size (Table 5, Models 3-5) demonstrating that in 
networks of the same size, more diverse networks have lower bandwidth communication channels. Inter-
estingly, the relationships do not seem to be driven by time and effort costs to network maintenance, but 
rather by the nature of relationships in sparse networks. The positive parameter estimate on the network 
size variable indicates that as actors cultivate more contacts the bandwidth of their communication chan-
nels widens rather than narrowing. If constraints on time and effort devoted to relationship maintenance 
were driving average channel bandwidth we would expect channel bandwidth to decrease as size in-
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creased. On the contrary, as actors communicate with more people they also exchange more messages per 
contact. Taken together, these results indicate that the thickness of communication channels is narrower in 
diverse networks populated with weak ties. The network size squared estimate is negative and significant 
in random effects specifications indicating that the marginal increase in channel bandwidth is decreasing 
in network size. Knowledge heterogeneity is negatively associated with channel bandwidth in both pair 
wise correlations ( ρ = - .25 p < .05) and random effects models ( β  = -.21 p < .01, Model 5) providing 
some insight into why diverse networks may be associated with lower channel bandwidth. Individuals 
whose contacts have diverse knowledge and experience communicate more infrequently and with lower 
volume per channel. This result is consistent with characterizations of weak ties in previous research 
(Granovetter 1973, Uzzi 1996) and provides new evidence that information flows may be weaker in di-
verse networks due to the experience and knowledge dissimilarity of individuals’ contacts – effects which 
are more pronounced in random effects models that consider variation across individuals. Demographic 
variables have no effect on channel bandwidth in Models 4-5, while education has a consistently negative 
relationship, perhaps indicating an ability of more educated employees to communicate more efficiently 
with fewer messages per channel. Fixed and random effects models are relatively consistent, except that 
network size and knowledge heterogeneity variables only effect channel bandwidth in random effects 
models, indicating that persistent variation in network size and knowledge heterogeneity across individu-
als explains part of the variation in channel bandwidth while changes in individuals’ network size and 
network knowledge heterogeneity over time does not. This is most likely because variation in network 
size and knowledge heterogeneity across individuals explains differences in channel bandwidth and be-
cause there are relatively smaller changes in these variables in a given individual’s network over time. 
----- TABLE 5 ----- 
The results in Table 5 Models 6-9 demonstrate that knowledge heterogeneity and network diver-
sity are positively correlated. Diverse networks are populated with contacts whose prior experience and 
knowledge is heterogeneous, providing evidence of the first possible mechanism through which diverse 
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networks deliver diverse information – by providing pipes into pools of heterogeneous information. The 
results in Table 4 Models 3 - 6 and 8 however demonstrate that network diversity moderates the relation-
ship between knowledge heterogeneity and access to diverse novel information. When network diversity 
is added to the regressions the relationship between knowledge heterogeneity and access to diverse novel 
information disappears. The positive relationship between knowledge heterogeneity and network diversity 
(Table 3 and Table 5) and the disappearance of the relationship between knowledge heterogeneity and 
diverse information when controlling for network diversity provides evidence that network diversity 
moderates the influence of knowledge heterogeneity on access to diverse information (Baron & Kenny 
1986). Something about the social connection between people, beyond their similarity in prior experience, 
explains the redundancy of the information they share with others. We suspect this reflects similarities in 
activity, purpose, task and the circumstances of a particular time and place and discuss the implications 
further in the conclusion.  
The results in Table 5 Models 6-9 also show a strong positive, but non-linear relationship be-
tween network size and network diversity: structural diversity is increasing in network size, but with di-
minishing marginal returns. This result supports hypothesis 4b and demonstrates why information bene-
fits to larger networks may be constrained in bounded organizational networks. As recruiters contact more 
colleagues, the contribution of a marginal contact to the structural diversity of a focal actor’s network is 
increasing, but with diminishing marginal returns. The implications of this tradeoff between size and 
structural diversity complement Burt’s (1992: 167) concepts of “effective size” and “efficiency.”37 Figure 
5 displays graphs relating network size, network diversity and information diversity, clearly showing the 
positive, non-linear relationships. 
----- FIGURE 5 ----- 
 
Network Structure, Information Diversity & Performance 
                                                          
37 In fact, Burt (1992: 169) finds stronger evidence of hole effects with the constraint measures we employ than with effective size, 
demonstrating “exclusive access is a critical quality of relations that span structural holes.” 
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 Finally, we test the performance implications of network structure and access to diverse, non-
redundant information as measured by revenues generated per month, projects completed per month, and 
the average duration of projects.38 Table 6 displays strong evidence of a positive relationship between ac-
cess to non-redundant information and performance.  
----- TABLE 6 ----- 
In random effects models, which incorporate variation within and between individuals, a one standard 
deviation increase in the amount of non-redundant information flowing to individuals is associated with 
on average with just over $4,600 more revenue generated (Model 10, p < .01), an extra one tenth of one 
project completed (Model 6, p < .01), and 15 days shorter average project duration per person per month 
(Model 2, p < .01). These results support Hypothesis 5a and provide evidence of ‘information advantages’ 
to network structure. Tables 4 and 6 together demonstrate that diverse networks provide access to diverse, 
non-redundant information, which in turn drives performance in information intensive work. As a robust-
ness check, we estimated the relationships between information diversity and performance with very simi-
lar results. A one standard deviation increase in information diversity is associated with increases in reve-
nues ( FEβ = 1322.97, N.S.; REβ = 2254.75, p < .01) and project completions ( FEβ = .036, p < .05; REβ = 
.049, p < .01), and reductions in average project duration ( FEβ = - 16.04, p < .01; REβ = - 15.78, p < .01). 
We also uncovered evidence of alternative mechanisms linking network structure to performance. 
Table 6 shows network diversity is positively associated with performance even when holding access to 
novel information constant, providing preliminary evidence of additional benefits to network structure 
beyond those conferred through information advantage. Holding access to novel information constant, 
network diversity is associated with greater revenue generation (Model 10, p < .10), more completed pro-
jects (Model 6, p < .05), and faster project completion (Models 2-4, p < .01, p < .05, p < .10). These re-
sults leave open the possibility that some benefits to network diversity come not from access to novel, 
                                                          
38 As there are some employees who do not take on projects or who are not involved in any projects in a given month, we only estimate equa-
tions for individuals with non-zero revenues in a given month. 
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non-redundant information, but rather from other mechanisms, like access to job support, power or organ-
izational influence. Finally, we tested whether the positive relationship between access to novel informa-
tion and performance was strictly linear, or rather whether access to novel information displayed dimin-
ishing marginal performance returns (Hypothesis 5b). We found across the board that access to non-
redundant information had diminishing marginal performance returns in each of our performance meas-
ures (Tables 6 & 7).  
----- TABLE 7 ----- 
These parameter estimates suggest that the marginal performance impacts of novel information 
are lower when employees already have access to significant amounts of novel information. In fact, as the 
graphs in Figure 6 demonstrate, there seem to be negative returns to more novel information beyond the 
normalized mean.39 These non-linearities in the value of novel information likely arise for the reasons 
outlined. First, beyond the threshold for decision relevance, new information adds no value. Second, em-
ployees’ capacity to process or act on new information may be constrained, making them less able to get 
the most out of novel information after having received too much of it. This explanation is consistent with 
theories of bounded rationality, cognitive capacity and information overload, as well as economic theories 
of the marginal value of new information. This result not only implies limits to the value of more novel 
information and larger and more diverse networks, it also may suggest a causal relationship between ac-
cess to novel information and performance. If causality ran in the other direction, such that the most pro-
ductive employees were magnets for more novel information, we would expect to observe increasing (or 
at least constant) returns to scale, meaning employees should continue to receive more novel information 
as they become more productive.40 
                                                          
39 For novel information greater than the normalized mean, coefficients in revenue regressions are negative and significant (β
FE
 = -3340.33, p < 
.05; β
RE
 = - 3207.06, p < .05) and in completed projects regressions are negative, though not significant (β
FE
 = -.04, N.S.; β
RE
=-.04, N.S.).  
40 We note that this is not definitive evidence of the direction of causality. We could witness diminishing returns for instance if novel 
information is finite or if recruiters send novel information to all above average recruiters in the same relative proportions but neglect to send 
novel information to non-star recruiters. Other contingencies may also exist. However, we propose this result as one piece of evidence suggesting 
a causal relationship rather than claiming it as definitive. In ongoing work we are exploring identification strategies explicitly and encourage 
more of this type of work. 
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----- FIGURE 6 ----- 
In fixed effects models, which control for variation explained by unobserved, time invariant char-
acteristics of individuals, a one unit increase in the amount of non-redundant information flowing to indi-
viduals is associated on average with just over $3,800 more revenue generated (p < .01), an extra one 
tenth of one project completed (p < .01), and 14 days shorter average project duration per person per 
month (p < .01), again supporting the argument that network diversity drives performance through its ef-
fects on access to non-redundant information (see Table 7). The relationship between non-redundant in-
formation and performance is non-linear in the case of all three performance metrics indicating diminish-
ing marginal returns to more novel information. Network diversity is associated with faster average pro-
ject completion even when controlling for access to novel information, while access to non-redundant 
information explains most of the variance in project completion and revenue generation in fixed effects 
models, indicating that small changes in individuals’ networks over time have less of an effect on per-
formance through non-information based mechanisms than does variation in networks across individu-
als.41 
 
Discussion & Conclusions 
We analyzed email topology and content data, detailed accounting records of project expertise, 
output and performance, and survey data on human capital and information seeking practices in an execu-
tive recruiting firm with fourteen offices across the United States. The results bring empirical evidence to 
bear on both the economic value of information and the information based mechanisms through which 
social networks generate social capital. There is evidence that diverse networks provide access to diverse 
                                                          
41 Given the core-periphery structure of the email network of this firm (displayed in Figure 3), we compared the effects of network diversity on 
performance for those employees physically located at the headquarters to those who worked in peripheral offices. Our estimates of pooled OLS 
regressions provide weak evidence that network diversity enhances performance on average, that being in a peripheral office reduces 
performance, and that the interaction effect of being in a peripheral office and having a diverse network is positive, implying the potential for  
network diversity to be even more important for the geographically isolated.  We do not report these results in this paper due to space and focus 
considerations and because estimated relationships are not robust to panel data procedures given being in the periphery is a time invariant binary 
variable. However, these results indicate that future work on the importance of network diversity for the geographically isolated may be fruitful. 
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non-redundant information and that access to non-redundant information in turn predicts productivity and 
performance. There are also important nuances in how information advantages from social structure are 
created and appropriated. Access to diverse, novel information is driven not only by structural diversity, 
but also by the bandwidth of communication channels and the knowledge heterogeneity of individuals’ 
contacts. A key insight is the need to incorporate within channel information diversity (as well as across 
channel diversity) into theory relating social structure to information access. Holding network diversity 
constant, greater channel bandwidth delivers more diverse novel information. But, as networks become 
more diverse, the bandwidth of communication channels narrows creating countervailing influences on 
access to non-redundant information. The relationship between network diversity and channel bandwidth 
seems to be driven not by relationship maintenance costs, but rather by the nature of the relationships de-
veloped in diverse networks. Although we do not directly observe these costs, if time and effort costs of 
relationship maintenance were driving reductions in channel bandwidth associated with more diverse 
networks, we would expect bandwidth to also decrease as network size increased – however, we find the 
opposite: channel bandwidth increases with network size, implying that there is something about the na-
ture of unconstrained relationships (other than time and effort costs) that reduces the thickness of infor-
mation flows between structurally diverse contacts – a finding consistent with prior evidence on the na-
ture of weak tie relationships (Granovetter 1973, Hansen 1999, Uzzi 1999). 
The estimated tradeoff between network diversity and channel bandwidth implies three contin-
gencies governing the ability of diverse networks to deliver diverse novel information. Although we can-
not robustly test these contingencies in our setting (because we observe only one network and one set of 
information), our analytical model implies that diverse networks should provide more novel information 
(a) when the space of topics discussed in a social network is large, (b) when the distribution of topics over 
nodes is non-uniform, and (c) when information in the network changes frequently. These testable predic-
tions follow from our analytical model and provide a theoretical starting point for future work. We ob-
serve some initial evidence of the first contingency – the importance of the size of the topic space – in our 
data. Business at this firm is cyclical. As demand picks up sharply in January and declines through the 
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next eight months, more emails are sent and received (Jan. = 166, Feb. = 139; t-statistic = 1.23, p < .11) 
and there is more total average non-redundant information present in the network (Jan. = 55.47, Feb. = 
45.74; t-statistic 1.34, p < .10) in January 2003 than in December 2003, indicating a larger topic space in 
the first month of the year.42 If diverse networks provide more novel information when the topic space in 
a network is large, then we should see a stronger relationship between network diversity and access to 
diverse novel information in January than in December. Although our data are limited when restricted to 
observations in these two months, we find that in January the relationship between network diversity and 
incoming information diversity is positive and significant ( Janβ = .46, S.E. = .15, p < .01), whereas in De-
cember the relationship is not discernable from zero ( Decβ = - .186, S.E. = .19, N.S.). Given this prelimi-
nary evidence, we encourage further investigation of these contingencies. 
Network diversity is a stronger predictor of access to diverse novel information than the knowl-
edge heterogeneity of contacts, which have been the primary focus of prior research examining ‘network 
content’ (e.g. Burt 2000, Rodan & Galunic 2004). We speculate that network diversity better predicts in-
formation flow because unlike the spread of disease, information diffusion is a discretionary process in 
which individuals make choices about the types of information they distribute among their contacts. The 
social nature of information sharing is influenced in part by social structure – meaning the connections 
between our contacts inform our decisions about the information we share. The relationship between so-
cial structure and social choices concerning information sharing make the diversity of communication 
networks a better predictor of access to information than the heterogeneity of the knowledge with which 
our contacts are endowed. A connection to an individual with a certain knowledge endowment affords the 
possibility of receiving that information but by no means guarantees it. The similarities of the subsets of 
information endowments that are shared are a function not only of the similarity of the knowledge and 
prior expertise of contacts but also of their similarities in current activity, purpose, task and role, which 
are reflected in cohesive social structure.  
                                                          
42 Statistics are reported per employee. 
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Network size is a concave predictor of access to diverse novel information in part because net-
work diversity is increasing in network size, but with diminishing returns. As actors establish relation-
ships with a finite set of possible contacts in an organization, the probability that a marginal relationship 
will be non-redundant, and provide access to novel information, decreases as possible alters in the net-
work are exhausted. These findings establish limits to the value of building larger and larger networks. 
The marginal benefit of adding contacts to a network is decreasing in network size because network di-
versity is bounded when the number of potential contacts is finite, as is the case in organizational net-
works. We expect the marginal value of additional contacts declines more rapidly in smaller organizations 
and in settings where diversity is limited by other environmental constraints such as a high degree of col-
location. 
We also find diminishing marginal productivity returns to novel information, a result consistent 
with anecdotal evidence of information overload, and theories of bounded rationality, limits to cognitive 
capacity and economic decision making. The value of additional information should decline in the 
amount of information individuals receive because there are constraints on our ability to process and act 
on more information. From the standpoint of economic theory, the marginal value of novel information 
should decline due to decision irrelevance, belief convergence and declining complementarities amongst 
disparate ideas. Future empirical work may uncover how much diversity is too much or the points at 
which additional novel information provides no additional value. We suspect that while the basic shape of 
the relationship between novel information and performance generalizes relatively broadly, the specific 
points at which the value of additional contacts or information begins to decline will depend on the setting 
under investigation, including the nature of the task, the size of the population and the characteristics of 
the information being shared, among other things. In the case of executive recruiting, diverse information 
is valuable because the quality of the match between a candidate and an open position is a function of the 
multitude of different options that are considered and because recruiters must fill different types of posi-
tions over time, necessitating access to different types of information on possible options. These two 
points emerged in our interviews with recruiters. We suspect that in some contexts information diversity 
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could have a negligible or even negative correspondence with performance. For example, in situations 
where the task (or decision space) is narrow or where precision and therefore redundancy are more impor-
tant than breadth, the relationship between diverse information and performance could be reversed. Estab-
lishing what types of work benefit most from diverse information and the contingencies that govern these 
relationships can help shape theory describing when and how diverse networks enable social capital de-
velopment. 
In our context, network diversity contributes to performance even when controlling for the posi-
tive performance effects of access to novel information, suggesting additional benefits to network diver-
sity beyond those conferred through information advantage. This finding leaves room for other mecha-
nisms linking network diversity to social capital and performance. Network contacts may provide non-
information based resources (e.g. Podolny & Barron 1997) such as power or control (e.g. Burt 1992), fa-
vorable trading relationships (e.g. Emerson 1962) or benefits from informal reciprocity (e.g. Cook, Emer-
son & Gilmore 1983). Surprisingly, traditional demographic and human capital variables (e.g. age, gen-
der, industry experience, education) have little effect on access to diverse information, highlighting the 
importance of network structure for information advantage. 
These results represent some of the first evidence on the relationship between network structure 
and the information content flowing in networks. But, relationships between social structure, information 
access and economic outcomes are subtle and complex and require more detailed theoretical development 
and empirical inquiry across different contexts. Our methods for analyzing network structure and infor-
mation content in email data are replicable, opening a new line of inquiry into the relationships among 
networks, information and economic performance. 
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Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses 
Domain Hypothesis Hypothesized Relationship 
Network Structure H1 
Network size and network diversity are positively associated 
with receiving more diverse information and more total non-
redundant information. 
H2a Network diversity is positively associated with the knowledge heterogeneity of actors’ contacts. Knowledge  
Heterogeneity H2b 
The knowledge heterogeneity of an actor’s contacts is positively 
associated with receiving more diverse information and more 
total non-redundant information. 
H3a Network diversity is associated with lower channel bandwidth. 
Channel Bandwidth H3b Channel bandwidth is positively associated with receiving more diverse information and more total non-redundant information. 
H4a The marginal increase in information diversity is decreasing in network size. Concavity of  Information Benefits to 
Network Size H4b The marginal increase in network diversity is decreasing in net-work size. 
H5a Access to non-redundant and diverse information is positively associated with recruiters’ productivity and performance. 
H5b The marginal increase in productivity and performance is de-creasing in the amount of novel information actors receive. Performance 
H5c Network diversity is positively associated with performance, controlling for access to novel information. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Age 522 42.36 10.94 24 67 
Gender (1=male) 657 .56 .50 0 1 
Industry Experience 522 12.52 9.52 1 39 
Years Education 522 17.66 1.33 15 21 
Total Incoming Emails 563 80.31 59.67 0 342 
Information Diversity 563 .57 .14 0 .87 
Total Non-Redundant Information 563 47.94 35.97 0 223.30 
Network Size 563 16.81 8.79 1 58 
Structural Holes 563 .71 .17 0 .91 
Structural Equivalence 563 77.25 16.32 27.35 175.86 
Knowledge Heterogeneity 560 .86 .07 .51 .97 
Channel Bandwidth 555 5.87 4.13 0 51 
Revenue 630 20962.03 18843.16 0 80808.41 
Completed Projects 630 .39 .36 0 1.69 
Average Project Duration (Days) 630 225.23 165.77 0 921.04 
 
Table 3: Pair Wise Correlations Between Independent Variables 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Age 1.00               
2. Gender (1=male) .11* 1.00              
3. Industry Experience .73* .20* 1.00             
4. Years Education .38* .06 .15* 1.00            
5. Total Incoming Email -.33* -.10* -.28* -.15* 1.00           
6. Information Diversity .09 .05 .16* .05 .29* 1.00          
7. Non-redundant Information -.32* -.09* -.27* -.12* .98* .36* 1.00         
8. Network Size -.07 .02 -.01 .09 .63* .45* .64* 1.00        
9. Network Diversity .12* .02 .25* .01 .34* .71* .35* .62* 1.00       
10. Structural Equivalence -.19* -.06 -.24* -.06 .23* -.08 .23* -.05 -.16* 1.00      
11. Knowledge Heterogeneity .11* .20* .27* .12* .03 .23* .04 .38* .46* -.21* 1.00     
12. Channel Bandwidth -.24* -.10* -.24* -.20* .19* .52* .50* -.02 -.02 .29* -.25* 1.00    
13. Revenue .44* -.02 .33* .15* -.09* .23* -.12* -.12* .27* -.16* .12* -.05 1.00   
14. Completed Projects .41* -.01 .29* .11* -.09* .23* -.11* -.09* .25* -.14* .10* -.07 .92* 1.00  
15. Average Project Duration .50* .12* .49* .21* -.30* .14* -.31* -.07 .18* -.21* .07 -.14* .54* .47* 1.00 
* p < .05 
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Table 4. Network Structure & Access to Diverse, Novel Information: Panel Data Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Information Diversity Non-Redundant Information 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Specification FE FE FE FE RE RE FE FE FE FE RE RE 
Age      -.004 (.008)      
-.004 
(.008) 
Gender      .147 (.096)      
-.053 
(.105) 
Education      -.013 (.041)      
-.045 
(.045) 
Industry Experience      .002 (.009)      
-.008 
(.009) 
Partner      .161 (.197)      
-.269 
(.214) 
Consultant      .159 (.149)      
-.293* 
(.162) 
Total Email Incoming  .002** (.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.002***
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001)       
Knowledge Heterogeneity .281*** (.051) 
.123***
(.052) 
.028 
(.041) 
.037 
(.042) 
-.023 
(.035) 
-.025 
(.041) 
.181*** 
(.044) 
.099* 
(.052) 
-.045 
(.047) 
-.011 
(.042) 
-.063* 
(.036) 
-.060 
(.042) 
Network Size  1.176***(.144) 
.439***
(.117) 
.505***
(.118) 
.612***
(.105) 
.587***
(.122)   
.733***
(.131) 
.668***
(.112) 
.746***
(.102) 
.834***
(.119) 
Network Size-Squared  -.815***(.115) 
-.250***
(.090) 
-.259***
(.089) 
-.361***
(.083) 
-.335***
(.092)   
-.120 
(.104) 
-.081 
(.089) 
-.108 
(.083) 
-.182* 
(.094) 
Network Diversity   .145***(.055) 
.155***
(.055) 
.230***
(.051) 
.162***
(.063)  
.206***
(.067) 
-.048 
(.063) 
.066 
(.054) 
.032 
(.052) 
.022 
(.064) 
Structural Equivalence   .019 (.034) 
.021 
(.034) 
.028 
(.031) 
.060 
(.038)  
-.032 
(.045) 
.027 
(.039) 
-.007 
(.034) 
.025 
(.032) 
-.014 
(.039) 
Channel Bandwidth    .085***(.031) 
.099***
(.031) 
.067** 
(.033)    
.352***
(.026) 
.377***
(.025) 
.360***
(.029) 
Constant -.223** (.105) 
.067 
(.113) 
.064 
(.089) 
.457***
(.085) 
.442***
(.092) 
.207 
(.700) 
-.172** 
(.076) 
.371***
(.081) 
.189***
(.071) 
-.101 
(.062) 
.112 
(.075) 
1.425† 
(.745) 
Temporal Controls Month / Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month /
Year 
Month /
Year 
Month /
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month /
Year 
Month /
Year 
Month / 
Year 
F-Value / Wald χ2 
(d.f.) 
7.51*** 
(10) 
12.75***
(12) 
5.43***
(14) 
5.54***
(15) 
148.9***
(15) 
108.3***
(21) 
11.73*** 
(9) 
10.02***
(11) 
23.13***
(13) 
41.75***
(14) 
755.5***
(14) 
646.6***
(20) 
R2 .14 .24 .14 .16 .27 .21 .18 .19 .40 .56 .65 .68 
Observations 556 556 538 535 535 429 556 538 538 535 535 429 
Hausman Test Results (RE Consistent & Efficient - Models 4 & 5): χ2 = 24.33**, p < .05; Hausman Test Results (RE Consistent & Efficient - Models 
10 & 11):  χ2 = 36.36***, p < .01. Note: * p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01. 
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Table 5. Information Advantage Mechanisms: Relationships Between Network Size, Network Diversity & Channel Bandwidth 
Dependent Variable: Channel Bandwidth Network Diversity 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Specification: FE FE FE RE RE FE FE RE RE 
Age     -.006 (.011)    
-.003 
(.006) 
Gender     -.113 (.136)    
-.183** 
(.079) 
Education     -.123** (.059)    
-.048 
(.034) 
Industry Experience     -.014 (.012)    
.018*** 
(.007) 
Partner     .145 (.284)    
-.006 
(.158) 
Consultant     -.231 (.217)    
.107 
(.118) 
Network Diversity -.314*** (.083) 
-.288*** 
(.089) 
-.335*** 
(.097) 
-.286*** 
(.089) 
-.190* 
(.111)     
Structural Equivalence .107* (.057) 
.101* 
(.059) 
.105* 
(.060) 
.167*** 
(.054) 
.149** 
(.068)     
Knowledge Heterogeneity  -.074 (.072) 
-.095 
(.075) 
-.209*** 
(.058) 
-.141** 
(.068) 
.384*** 
(.044) 
.185*** 
(.043) 
.189*** 
(.033) 
.126*** 
(.037) 
Network Size   .213 (.203) 
.476*** 
(.171) 
.398** 
(.199)  
1.229*** 
(.115) 
1.443*** 
(.087) 
1.369*** 
(.089) 
Network Size-Squared   -.123 (.160) 
-.345** 
(.142) 
-.333** 
(.161)  
-.812*** 
(.096) 
-1.002*** 
(.079) 
-.885*** 
(.080) 
Constant .062 (.109) 
.060 
(.110) 
.072 
(.111) 
.105 
(.124) 
2.793*** 
(.972) 
-.127* 
(.075) 
.020 
(.069) 
-.158** 
(.074) 
.702 
(.557) 
Temporal Controls Month / Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
F-Value / Wald χ2 
(d.f.) 
4.52*** 
(10) 
4.19*** 
(11) 
3.65*** 
(13) 
74.63*** 
(13) 
76.63*** 
(19) 
18.55*** 
(9) 
30.48*** 
(11) 
622.29*** 
(11) 
541.42*** 
(17) 
R2 .09 .09 .10 .20 .24 .26 .41 .61 .62 
Observations 536 535 535 535 429 556 556 556 442 
Hausman Test Results (RE Consistent & Efficient - Models 3 & 4): 21.23*, p < .10; Hausman Test Results (RE Consistent & Efficient - Models 7 & 8): 
411.38***, p < .01. Note: * p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01. 
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Table 6. Network Diversity, Non-Redundant Information and Individual Performance - Random Effects Estimates 
Dependent 
Variable: Project Duration Completed Projects Revenue 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Specification RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE 
Age    -.124 (2.56)    
-.006 
(.006)    
-257.49 
(297.91) 
Gender 
(Male=1)    
-2.33 
(32.96)    
-.117 
(.081)    
-7583.31**
(3841.14) 
Education    10.34 (13.52)    
-.017 
(.033)    
-14.84.2 
(1584.94) 
Industry  
  Experience    
3.50 
(2.39)    
.003 
(.006)    
26.64 
(280.04) 
Partner    -17.20 (75.86)    
.239 
(.191)    
18811.08**
(9124.73) 
Consultant    -56.69 (60.89)    
.286* 
(.154)    
12761.9* 
(7351.83) 
Network 
  Diversity 
-12.61*** 
(4.07) 
-10.91*** 
(4.08) 
-9.13** 
(4.14) 
-9.46* 
(4.97) 
.054*** 
(.017) 
.039** 
(.017) 
.019 
(.016) 
.004 
(.020) 
2276.6***
(856.13) 
1656.50* 
(852.79) 
656.15 
(851.49) 
-407.21 
(1050.23) 
Non- 
Redundant 
Information 
 -14.67*** (5.33) 
-20.03***
(5.85) 
-23.23***
(6.91)  
.104*** 
(.021) 
.152*** 
(.023) 
.189*** 
(.027)  
4678.81***
(111.20) 
6984.64***
(1168.87) 
8974.12***
(1421.87) 
Non- 
Redundant 
Information 
Squared 
  16.44** (7.59) 
13.53 
(9.85)   
-.166*** 
(.031) 
-.213*** 
(.041)   
-8249.0***
(1619.59) 
-10396***
(2112.13) 
Constant 289.16*** (14.17) 
282.08*** 
(14.27) 
282.87***
(14.30) 
75.61 
(239.66) 
.589*** 
(.039) 
.639*** 
(.040) 
.629*** 
(.038) 
1.031* 
(.591) 
31620*** 
(1933.77) 
33891.6***
(1963.95) 
33340.6***
(1903.88) 
64041.51**
(28019.77)
Temporal  
  Controls 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Wald χ2 
(d.f.) 
24.53*** 
(9) 
32.47*** 
(10) 
37.53*** 
(11) 
44.24*** 
(17) 
20.93*** 
(9) 
45.16*** 
(10) 
76.83*** 
(11) 
81.69*** 
(17) 
15.38* 
(9) 
33.83*** 
(10) 
62.01*** 
(11) 
72.89*** 
(17) 
R2 .004 .03 .03 .25 .07 .14 .20 .31 .07 .14 .20 .29 
Obs. 420 420 420 320 420 420 420 320 420 420 420 320 
Note: * p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Logic of the Information Advantage argument. 
Table 7. Network Diversity, Non-Redundant Information and Individual Performance - Fixed Effects Estimates 
 Project Duration Project Completions Revenue 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Specification FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Network 
  Diversity 
-14.23*** 
(4.18) 
-12.74*** 
(4.19) 
-11.03*** 
(-19.94) 
.032* 
(.018) 
.022 
(.018) 
.005 
(.018) 
565.33 
(934.08) 
165.14 
(931.51) 
-564.46 
(926.08) 
Non- 
Redundant Information  
-14.21*** 
(5.44) 
-19.95*** 
(6.02)  
.097*** 
(.023) 
.150*** 
(.025)  
3806.12*** 
(1211.06) 
6258.47*** 
(1316.03) 
Non- 
Redundant Information 
Squared 
  16.61** (7.64)   
-.154*** 
(.032)   
-7105.14***
(1669.37) 
Constant 295.10*** (6.08) 
288.93*** 
(6.48) 
290.10*** 
(6.47) 
.617*** 
(.027) 
.659*** 
(.028) 
.649*** 
(.027) 
33585.03***
(1359.91) 
35238.48***
(1442.79) 
34736.2*** 
(1414.51) 
Temporal  
  Controls 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
Month / 
Year 
F-Value 
(d.f.) 
2.89*** 
(9) 
3.32*** 
(10) 
3.48*** 
(11) 
1.54 
(9) 
3.15*** 
(10) 
5.11*** 
(11) 
1.27 
(9) 
2.16** 
(10) 
3.70*** 
(11) 
R2 .07 .09 .10 .04 .08 .14 .03 .06 .10 
Obs. 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Hausman Test Results (Tables 6 & 7, Model 3): 3.69, N.S.; Hausman Test Results (Tables 6 & 7, Model 6): 13.27, N.S.; Hausman Test Results (Tables 6 & 
7, Model 9): 29.20***, p < .01.  Note: * p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01. 
DIVERSE  
NETWORK 
STRUCTURE 
HETEROGENEOUS, 
NOVEL  
INFORMATION 
 
PRODUCTIVITY, 
PERFORMANCE,  
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Figure 2. The email network of the firm displays a hub and spoke structure, with a dense core in the firm headquar-
ters and spokes in various offices located across the U.S. 
 
 
Figure 3. Our theory and analytical model propose that information access is a function not only of network struc-
ture (Panel (i)), but also of relationship channel bandwidth (Panel (ii)), and knowledge stocks (Panel (iii)) across 
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heterogeneous topics (Panel (iv)). Panel (ii) depicts that actor B may receive more total non-redundant information 
in a cohesive network due to greater channel bandwidth. Panel (iv) shows that B may receive more total non-
redundant information on a greater number of topics due to greater channel bandwidth even though A’s contacts 
have greater diversity in their information stocks. 
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Figure 4. A three dimensional Vector Space Model of three documents is shown on the left. A Vector Space 
Model containing a test inbox with emails clustered along three dimensions is shown on the right. 
 
  
Figure 5. Graphs showing relationships between network size, network diversity and information diversity. 
 
 
Figure 6. Graphs of the relationships between novel information, completed projects and revenue. 
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Appendix A. Model Derivation 
This short section provides the derivation for Equation 1.  Let there be 1 … n1 topics in topic set n1 and 1 … n2 top-
ics in topic set n2 for a total of n1+n2 = T.  Define the likelihoods of encountering n1 and n2  topics as p1 and p2 re-
spectively.  It follows that n1p1 + n2p2 = 1.  Further, define the following: 
 
1=lkI  if link l connects to idea k, 0 otherwise. 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ == ∑=
otherwise
IifJ
L
l
lk
k
0
01
1  
Ψ = {Event that link L+1 connects to a new idea} 
 
Here, Jk indicates whether idea k has failed to appear among the information provided by any of the links 1 … L.  
With this terminology, we can now derive P(Ψ), the probability of encountering a new idea given that there are k 
ideas remaining to be seen. 
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The last step arises because an idea that occurs with probability p must not have occurred in any of the previous L 
draws. This completes the derivation.  It is useful to note three properties. First, having no prior links L=0 implies 
that a new idea is encountered with certainty.  Second, increasing links without bound L→∞ implies the chances of 
encountering a new idea approach 0.  Third, unbiased information implies p1= p2=1/T.  Further, if ideas in n1 be-
come B times more likely to appear among in-group communications, then p1=B/T which implies that p2=
1
11
nT
T
Bn
−
−  
(with n1 < T, B<T, and n1B ≤ T) which simplifies Equation 4 in the main text. 
 
Appendix B. Descriptions & Correlations of Information Diversity Metrics 
 
1. Cosine Distance Variance 
Variance based on cosine distance (cosine similarity): 
( )( )
N
MdCos
ID
N
j
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i
I
ij
I
i
∑
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We measure the variance of deviation of email topic vectors from the mean topics vector and average the deviation 
across emails in a given inbox or outbox.  The distance measurement is derived from a well-known document simi-
larity measure – the cosine similarity of two topic vectors. 
 
2. Dice’s Coefficient Variance 
Variance based on Dice’s Distance and Dice’s Coefficient: 
( )( )
N
dDistDice
VarDice
N
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I
ij
I
i
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2
, where 
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Similar to VarCos, variance is used to reflect the deviation of the topic vectors from the mean topic vector.  Dice’s 
coefficient is used as an alternative measure of the similarity of two email topic vectors. 
 
3. Average Common Cluster 
AvgCommon measures the level to which the documents in the document set reside in different k-means clusters 
produced by the eClassifier algorithm: 
( )( )
N
ddCommonDist
AvgCommon
N
j
I
j
I
j
I
i
∑
== 1
21 ,
, 
where ),( 21
I
j
I
j dd represents a given pair of documents (1 and 2) in an inbox and j indexes all pairs of documents in 
an inbox, and where: 
 ( ) ( )I jIjI jIj ddCommonSimddCommonDist 2121 ,1, −=  
( ) ∑∑= Iterations
clustersameinIterations
ddCommonSim I j
I
j
___
, 21  
AvgCommon is derived from the concept that documents are similar if they are clustered together by k-means clus-
tering and dissimilar if they are not clustered together. The k-means clustering procedure is repeated several times, 
creating several clustering results with 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 … 200 clusters. This measures counts the number of times 
during this iterative process two emails were clustered together divided by the number of clustering iterations. There-
fore, every two emails in an inbox and outbox that are placed in separate clusters contribute to higher diversity val-
ues. 
 
4. Average Common Cluster with Information Content 
AvgCommonIC uses a measure of the “information content” of a cluster to weight in which different emails reside. 
AvgCommonIC extends the AvgCommon concept by compensating for the different amount of information provided 
in the fact that an email resides in the same bucket for either highly diverse or tightly clustered clusters.  For exam-
ple, the fact that two emails are both in a cluster with low intra-cluster diversity is likely to imply more similarity 
between the two emails than the fact that two emails reside in a cluster with high intra-cluster diversity. ( )
levelsbucketofnumbertotal
DDmCommonICSi bucketsameinDD
documentsall
buckettheindocuments
documentsall ____
log
)log(
1),( __,
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___
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121
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),(1),( 2121 DDmCommonICSiDDstCommonICDi −=  { }),( 21
, 21
ddstCommonICDiaverageCAvgCommonI
documentsdd ∈
=  
 
5. Average Cluster Distance 
AvgBucDiff measures diversity using the similarity/distance between the clusters that contain the emails: { }),( 21
, 21
ddDocBucDistaverageAvgBucDiff
documentsdd ∈
= , where 
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2121 BB
mmCosDistBBBucketDist = . 
AvgBucDiff extends the concept of AvgCommon by using the similarity/distance between clusters.  While 
AvgCommon only differentiates whether two emails are in the same cluster, AvgBucDiff also considers the distance 
between the clusters that contain the emails. 
 
Correlations Between the Five Measures of Information Diversity 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. VarCosSim 1.0000     
2. VarDiceSim 0.9999 1.0000    
3. AvgCommon 0.9855 0.9845 1.0000   
4. AvgCommonIC 0.9943 0.9937 0.9973 1.0000  
5. AvgClusterDist 0.9790 0.9778 0.9993 0.9939 1.0000 
 
Appendix C: External Validation of Diversity Measures 
We validated our diversity measurement using an independent, publicly available corpus of documents 
from Wikipedia.org. Wikipedia.org, the user created online encyclopedia, stores entries according to a hierarchy of 
topics representing successively fine-grained classifications. For example, the page describing “genetic algorithms,” 
is assigned to the “Genetic Algorithms” category, found under “Evolutionary Algorithms,” “Machine Learning,” 
“Artificial Intelligence,” and subsequently under “Technology and Applied Sciences.” This hierarchical structure 
enables us to construct clusters of entries on diverse and focused subjects and to test whether our diversity meas-
urement can successfully characterize diverse and focused clusters accurately.  
We created a range of high to low diversity clusters of Wikipedia entries by selecting entries from either 
the same sub-category in the topic hierarchy to create focused clusters, or from a diverse set of unrelated subtopics 
to create diverse clusters. For example, we created a minimum diversity cluster (Type-0) using a fixed number of 
documents from the same third level sub-category of the topic hierarchy, and a maximum diversity cluster (Type-9) 
using documents from unrelated third level sub-categories. We then constructed a series of document clusters (Type-
0 to Type-9) ranging from low to high topic diversity from 291 individual entries as shown in Figure 3.43 The topic 
hierarchy from which documents were selected appears at the end of this section. 
If our measurement is robust, our diversity measures should identify Type-0 clusters as the least diverse 
and Type-9 clusters as the most diverse. We expect diversity will increase relatively monotonically from Type-0 to 
Type-9 clusters, although there could be debate for example about whether Type-4 clusters are more diverse than 
Type-3 clusters.44 After creating this independent dataset, we used the Wikipedia entries to generate keywords and 
measure diversity using the methods described above. Our methods were very successful in characterizing diversity 
and ranking clusters from low to high diversity. Figure 3 displays cosine similarity metrics for Type-0 to Type-9 
clusters using 30, 60, and 90 documents to populate clusters. All five diversity measures return increasing diversity 
scores for clusters selected from successively more diverse topics.45 Overall, these results give us confidence in the 
                                                          
43 We created several sets of clusters for each type and averaged diversity scores for clusters of like type. We repeated the process using 3, 6 and 
9 document samples per cluster type to control for the effects of the number of documents on diversity measures. 
44 Whether Type-3 or Type-4 clusters are more diverse depends on whether the similarity of two documents in the same third level sub category 
is greater or less than the difference of similarities between documents in the same second level sub category as compared to documents in 
categories from the first hierarchical layer onwards. This is, to some extent, an empirical question. 
45 The measures produce remarkably consistent diversity scores for each cluster type and the diversity scores increase relatively monotonically 
from Type-0 to Type-9 clusters. The diversity measures are not monotonically increasing for all successive sets, such as Type-4, and it is likely 
that the information contained in Type-4 clusters are less diverse than Type-3 clusters due simply to the fact that two Type-4 documents are taken 
from the same third level sub category. 
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ability of our diversity measurement to characterize the subject diversity of groups of text documents of varying 
sizes. 
Document clusters selected from Wikipedia.org  
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Figure C1.  Wikipedia.org Document Clusters and Diversity Measurement Validation Results. 
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Appendix D: Estimation Procedures 
 The fixed effects estimator uses variation within observations of a single individual over time. The basic 
specification includes observations of dependent and independent variables for each individual in each cross sec-
tional time period t, and a time invariant vector of individual characteristics iα representing unobserved heterogene-
ity across individuals: 
ititiit xy εβα ++= .            [10] 
The fixed effects transformation, also called the within transformation, is obtained by first averaging equation 10 
over t = 1,…, T, to create the cross section equation, also called the between estimator:  
iiii xy εβα ++= ,             [11] 
where 
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i
∑= 1εε . 
By subtracting equation 11 from equation 10, the fixed effects transformation removes unobserved time invariant 
individual specific heterogeneity embodied in iα : 
+ Computer science > 
+ Artificial intelligence 
 + Machine learning 
 + Natural language processing 
 + Computer vision 
+ Cryptography 
 + Theory of cryptography 
 + Cryptographic algorithms 
 + Cryptographic protocols 
+ Computer graphics 
 + 3D computer graphics 
 + Image processing 
 + Graphics cards 
+ Geography >  
+ Climate 
 + Climate change 
 + History of climate 
 + Climate forcing 
+ Cartography 
 + Maps 
 + Atlases 
 + Navigation 
+ Exploration 
 + Space exploration 
 + Exploration of  
Australia
+ Technology >  
+ Robotics 
 + Robots 
 + Robotics competitions 
+ Engineering 
 + Electrical engineering 
 + Bioengineering 
 + Chemical engineering 
+ Video and movie technology 
 + Display technology 
 + Video codecs 
 + Digital photography 
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iitiitiit xxyy εεβ −+−=− )( .           [12] 
The fixed effects estimator produces estimates using variation within observations of the same individuals over time 
and allows us to estimate the effects of network structure controlling for unobserved omitted variables that could 
bias our estimates. 
 While the fixed effects estimator helps us estimate the effects of network structure on information access 
and performance controlling for unobservable omitted variables, it has several drawbacks. First, we are also inter-
ested in the effects of observable time invariant characteristics of individuals, such as demography (e.g. age, gen-
der), human capital (e.g. education, industry tenure), and organizational hierarchy (e.g. individuals position in the 
firms formal organizational structure), on access to information and performance. More precisely, we are interested 
in the relative effects of network structure on information access and performance compared to these traditional fac-
tors. As the fixed effects estimator washes away variation in time invariant characteristics, it makes estimation of 
these parameters impossible. Second, we believe that variation across individuals also helps explain differences in 
information access and performance correlated with network structure. An individual may be able to manipulate the 
information they receive by changing their communication patterns over time, but persistent structural differences 
between individuals could also explain performance differentials. We therefore estimate both pooled OLS and ran-
dom effects models of our specifications. 
  The OLS estimator on pooled data estimates an unweighted average of the within and between estimators. 
Although we do not report these results in the tables, we produced pooled OLS estimates of our specifications with 
very similar results, which most closely resembled the random effects estimates we report. We estimated the pooled 
OLS specifications with robust clustered standard errors in order to control for the fact that repeated observations of 
the same individuals over time in panel data may artificially constrict the standard errors. Clustered robust standard 
errors treat each individual as a super-observation for part of its contribution to the variance estimate 
(e.g. cicci υηε += , where cη is an individual effect and ciυ the idiosyncratic error). They are robust to correlations 
within the observations of each individual, but are never fully efficient. They represent conservative estimates of 
standard errors.  
When variables of interest do not vary much over time, fixed effects methods can produce imprecise esti-
mates. In our case, we are not only interested in estimating the impact of time invariant characteristics of individuals 
on access to information and performance (e.g. age, gender, education), but we also know that certain aspects of 
network structure change relatively little over time. We therefore estimate both fixed effects and random effects 
specifications. The random effects model estimates a matrix weighted average of the between [11] and within [12] 
estimators where the weighting matrixλ accounts for correlation across observations in the residuals, as follows: 
iitiitiit xxyy λεεβλλ −+−=− )( .          [13] 
We estimateλ  as a function of the idiosyncratic error variance and the group specific error variance. When 0=λ , 
the procedure is equivalent to estimating OLS, and when 1=λ we are estimating fixed effects. The random effects 
model brings efficiency gains and the ability to estimate parameters of time invariant covariates at the risk of incon-
sistency. To test the consistency of the random effects estimator, we conduct Hausman tests (Hausman 1978) com-
paring fixed and random effects models and report our results in the table notes for each set of results. 
 
